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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Primal Screams (U.S. v. Stevens)
“[A] kitten, secured to the ground, watches and shrieks in pain as 
a woman thrusts her high-heeled shoe into its body, slams her heel into 
the kitten’s eye socket and mouth loudly fracturing its skull, and stomps 
repeatedly on the animal’s head. The kitten hemorrhages blood, screams 
blindly in pain, and is ultimately left dead in a moist pile of blood-soaked 
hair and bone.”1
This horrific behavior arouses certain people who will buy 
videos depicting such torture and killing of “helpless animals, including 
cats, dogs, monkeys, mice, and hamsters.”2 Although such behavior is 
typically illegal under state law, the videos rarely disclose the identities 
of the criminals involved.3 Because of this, Congress recognized that 
prosecution of the crime itself is difficult.4 However, Congress 
recognized that law enforcement could identify the videos’ vendors.5 In 
1999, Congress therefore enacted 18 U.S.C. §48 (hereafter “Section 48”) 
to criminalize certain depictions of unlawful animal cruelty and thereby 
reduce the demand for both the depictions and the depicted illegal 
conduct.6
As quoted by the Court, Section 48 provided in full: 
§ 48. Depiction of animal cruelty 
                                                          
1. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. __, __, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1598 (2010) 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae The Humane Society of the 
United States in Support of Petitioner at 2, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. __, 
130 S .Ct. 1577 (2010) (No. 08-769), 2009 WL 1681460, at *2). 
2. Stevens, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct at 1583 (majority opinion). 
3. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1603 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
4. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1598; 145 CONG. REC. S15220 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 
1999) (statement of Sen. Robert Smith); 145 CONG. REC. H10267 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 
1999) (statement of Rep. Elton Gallegly). 
5. 145 CONG. REC. H10267 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1999) (statement of Rep. 
Spencer Bachus). 
6. Stevens, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1598 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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(a) CREATION, SALE, OR POSSESSION.–Whoever 
knowingly creates, sells, or possesses a depiction 
of animal cruelty with the intention of placing that 
depiction in interstate or foreign commerce for 
commercial gain, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. 
(b) EXCEPTION.–Subsection (a) does not apply to 
any depiction that has serious religious, political, 
scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or 
artistic value. 
(c) DEFINITIONS.–In this section–
(1) the term “depiction of animal cruelty” means
any visual or auditory depiction, including any 
photograph, motion-picture film, video recording, 
electronic image, or sound recording of conduct in 
which a living animal is intentionally maimed, 
mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed, if such 
conduct is illegal under Federal law or the law of 
the State in which the creation, sale, or possession 
takes place, regardless of whether the maiming, 
mutilation, torture, wounding, or killing took place 
in the State; and 
(2) the term “State” means each of the several 
States, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, 
Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of 
the Northern Mariana Islands, and any other 
commonwealth, territory, or possession of the 
United States.7
Section 48 apparently worked—the statute’s sponsors declared 
the commercial crush video trade dead by 2007.8 Unfortunately for the 
animals, however, after finding that the statute reached beyond 
depictions of intentional animal cruelty, the Court held Section 48 
unconstitutionally overbroad and struck it down.9 How could the Court 
                                                          
7. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1582 n.1 (majority opinion). 
8. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1598 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
9. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1592 (majority opinion). 
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have reached such an awful result? How could the Court have reasonably 
found that language providing that “any visual or auditory depiction . . .  
in which a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, 
wounded, or killed . . . ” could reach beyond depictions of intentional 
infliction of animal cruelty?10 As we shall see, a better understanding of 
semiotics (i.e., the philosophy of meaning and signs)— including the 
roles of purpose and framing in statutory interpretation, and the various 
ways living beings might be used as instruments of expression— should 
have led to a more enlightened result in this case.11
B. Primal Decency (Snyder v. Phelps)
“God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” “America is 
Doomed,” “Don’t Pray for the USA,” “Thank God for IEDs,” “Fag 
Troops,” “Semper Fi Fags,” “God Hates Fags,” “Maryland Taliban,” 
“Fags Doom Nations,” “Not Blessed Just Cursed,” “Thank God for Dead 
Soldiers,” “Pope in Hell,” “Priests Rape Boys,” “You’re Going to Hell,” 
and “God Hates You.”12
The above placard phrases were among those held up by 
picketers in conjunction with the funeral of a heterosexual American 
soldier killed in the line of duty.13 The picketers associated themselves 
with the funeral to garner added attention for their placards.14 Although a 
jury thereafter found that the picketers had caused the dead soldier’s 
father intentional emotional distress, the Court in effect found that, under 
the facts of the case, the picketers had a First Amendment right to use the 
                                                          
10. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1582 n.1. See infra Part III.C. for a discussion and 
critical analysis of the Court’s reasoning in Stevens v. United States.
11. See infra Part III.D. Congress quickly passed substitute legislation, the 
Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 2010, P.L. 111-294, H.R. 5566, which 
President Obama signed into law on December 9, 2010. See Abigail Lauren Perdue, 
When Bad Things Happen to Good Laws: The Rise, Fall, and Future of Section 48,
18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 469, 535 (2011). However, the effectiveness and 
constitutionality of the substitute act remain a matter of debate. See id. at 534–48; 
Andrew A. Beerworth, United States v. Stevens: A Proposal For Criminalizing 
Crush Videos Under Current Free Speech Doctrine, 35 VT. L. REV. 901, 917–24
(2011). 
12. Snyder v. Phelps, __ U.S. __, __, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216–17 (2011). 
13. Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1225 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
14. See id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1213–14 (majority opinion). 
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funeral to garner such added attention regardless of the grievous injury 
inflicted upon the father.15 Again, how could the Court have reached 
such an awful result? As we shall see, a better understanding of semiotics 
(including, again, the various ways living beings might be used as 
instruments of expression) should have led to a more enlightened result 
in this case as well.16
C. Primal Principles 
Proper handling of cases like the ones above requires, among 
other things, a fundamental understanding of how meaning works, how 
meaning is found, how living beings can be used as instruments of 
expression, and how the rights of living beings must be recognized and 
balanced when such beings are used as instruments of expression. At the 
outset, this requires understanding and recognizing the following 
principles: 
1. Interpretation Involves Purpose and Frame as Well as Words 
When interpreting a rule, regulation, statute, constitution, or 
contract, one must, of course, understand how meaning works before one 
can attempt to ascribe meaning to the matter at hand. As further 
discussed below, meaning involves three interrelated levels: reference, 
frame and disposition. The first or reference level of meaning is the focal 
point of experience, thought, or emotion explored.17 For example, if I 
have a particular sound that I wish to analyze, that unanalyzed sensation 
is a reference. The second or framing level of meaning consists of the 
possible judgments or determinations one may make about that 
reference.18 For example, I may concede that sound indicates either a fly 
or a bee. The third or disposition level of meaning is a determination or 
                                                          
15. See id.
16. See infra Part IV. As we shall see, though Stevens and Phelps employ 
different kinds of signs in their expression, they are analogous in forcing living 
beings to participate in a type of expression that such living beings reject. See infra
Parts III, IV. 
17. See infra Part II.A. 
18. See infra Part II.A. 
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resolution made about the reference as framed.19 Continuing with the 
buzzing example, I might conclude that I am hearing a bee—one of the 
only two possibilities as framed. Of course, other possibilities would 
exist under other frames such as “the sound indicates a bee, fly, wasp, or 
hornet.” In the legal context, one must always be vigilant in 
understanding the frame employed, and one should never simply concede 
a result because the frame demands it when another reasonable frame 
may generate a different result.20
The meaning of a rule, regulation, statute, constitution, or 
contract is no less triply-complex than the meaning of “bee.” Meaning in 
this context also involves a reference (often a goal or problem 
addressed), a frame (often the words of a rule, regulation, statute, 
constitution or contract addressing the goal or problem), and a 
disposition (often the determination or resolution of matters involving 
the reference). For example, the reference of a statute criminalizing child 
pornography can be the desired prohibition of child pornography, the 
frame can be the words of the statute, and the disposition of a particular 
case under the statute can be the handling of the case in light of the 
desired prohibition and the words of the statute (or in other words, in 
light of the reference and the frame). In both such cases, no meaning 
exists without a reference and a frame, and frames are both fungible and 
permissive of multiple resolutions (such as the conclusion that the buzz 
indicates the presence of a bee or fly or, under a different frame, a wasp 
or hornet). 
Thus: (1) competent courts must consider the purposes and 
goals of any rule, regulation, statute, constitution or contract under 
interpretation; and (2) forthright courts must concede the importance 
and flexibility of framing. As we shall see, straightforward 
acknowledgement and understanding of these two points lead to a more 
rational, honest, and humane analysis of the crush video case, U.S. v. 
Stevens,21 and with further semiotic insight, a better analysis of the 
funeral protest case, Snyder v. Phelps22 as well. 
                                                          
19. See infra Part II.A. 
20. See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, MINDING THE LAW 173–76 (2000). 
21. See infra Part III. 
22. See infra Part IV. 
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2. Living Signifiers Have Rights 
As discussed in more detail below, living beings can be used as 
instruments of expression.23 For example, in discourse, we might use our 
mayor to signify our city. However, one might also try to use him in 
more pernicious ways. A madman might wish to tar and feather him to 
signify disgust with city management. Conceding, for the sake of 
argument, that the madman has the right to express disgust with city 
management, surely no reasonable person would hold that the rights of 
the mayor would not also come into play in such a case of expression.24
Thus: (3) competent courts must consider and weigh the rights of living 
beings when others would use such living beings as instruments of 
expression (or “signifiers” as we shall define the term below).25 This 
obvious moral principle seemed to play little if any role in both the crush 
video case of U.S. v. Stevens and the funeral protest case of Snyder v. 
Phelps. Because this moral principle was not carefully considered in 
these cases, the more fundamental question of when usage of living 
creatures as signifiers occurs also was not addressed.26 A basic 
                                                          
23. See infra Part II.A. 
24. As Steven J. Heyman succinctly puts it, “[t]he First Amendment should not 
be interpreted to protect speech that violates the rights of other people, except in 
situations where the value of the speech outweighs the value of the other rights with 
which it conflicts.” Steven J. Heyman, To Drink the Cup of Fury: Funeral Picketing, 
Public Discourse, and the First Amendment, 45 CONN. L. REV. 101, 108 (2012). As 
a matter of simple logic, such balancing must of course be allowed since no 
considerations of harm to others could potentially “lead to the protection of every 
terrorist act.” Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: A Response to Critics, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 979, 982 (1990). See infra note 90 for cases supporting the 
conclusion that the First Amendment does not protect violence. See infra Parts II.E, 
III.D.2.c (discussing the need to balance interests). 
25. See infra Part II.A. 
26. Though the Court found no compelled participation in expression in 
Stevens and Snyder, it has rejected attempts to compel speech in some cases. See
Alan Brownstein & David Amar, Death, Grief, And Freedom of Speech: Does the 
First Amendment Permit the Harassment and Commandeering of Funeral 
Mourners?, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 368 (2010) (analogizing Snyder to 
“compelled speech” cases and discussing, inter alia, Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 
705 (1977) (which invalidated a Vermont statute requiring residents to display “Live 
Free or Die” on their license plates), Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 
241 (1974) (which invalidated equal time requirements for newspapers), and Pac. 
LLOYDBN3.DOC 1/13/2014 9:24 AM 
2013] SEMIOTICS OF FREE EXPRESSION  245 
understanding of the types of signifiers assists in this analysis; this 
includes understanding how types of signifiers such as indices by 
definition use living signifiers in ways that require considering the rights 
of such living beings.27
3. Speech Involves More Than Mere “Expression” or “Ideas”
As in Stevens and Snyder, when focusing on the permissibility of 
message, idea, or content-based governmental restrictions, much First 
Amendment analysis downplays or ignores the harm caused by the 
regulated expression. 28 On the surface, this may seem required by some 
(or all) of the reasons commonly given for protection of speech: 
protecting democracy and our right to self-governance,29 permitting “the 
search for knowledge and ‘truth’ in the marketplace of ideas,”30
protecting “individual autonomy, self-expression, or self-fulfillment,”31
and fostering tolerance.32 Without delving more deeply beneath the 
surface, one may conclude that regulating the content of one’s speech 
endangers one’s right to speak on matters of public concern, interferes 
with the battle of truth in the marketplace of ideas, and circumscribes 
one’s autonomy, self-expression, and self-fulfillment. 
However, matters are not this simple. As discussed in more 
detail below, speech and other expression involve more than message, 
                                                          
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (which invalidated 
a requirement that utility companies include third party messages in their billings)). 
27. See infra Part II.C. 
28. See Heyman, supra note 24, at 141–42 (lamenting a trend to this effect 
over the last four decades); see also Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 
95 (1972) (holding that governments may not restrict expression based on message, 
idea, subject matter or content). 
29. See generally James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central 
Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491 (2011) (arguing that a 
theory of individual participation in the democratic process explains the First 
Amendment’s structure). 
30. Id. at 502 (setting forth the rationale and arguing that “a completely 
unregulated market of ideas will lead to discovery of truth is highly contestable”).
31. Id. at 502–04; Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value,
33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443, 498–503 (1998) (“First Amendment analysis 
[should] attend more self-consciously to the speaker’s development through 
expression.”).
32. See Bollinger, supra note 24, at 984–85. 
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idea, or content,33 and good First Amendment analysis must 
acknowledge this. Speech and other expression involve the use of signs, 
and signs involve elements other than “content” or “meaning.”34
Failure to consider these other elements in some cases can have 
horrific results. Considering the madman example again,35 how would 
allowing him to tar and feather the mayor protect autonomy? How would 
permitting such tarring and feathering further self-governance, aid the 
discovery of truth, or foster tolerance? 
As discussed below, although courts have limited speech in 
certain areas because of damage to others,36 they have not done so in 
other cases such as Stevens and Phelps where living beings have suffered 
grievous injury.37 This paper will explore one reason for such judicial 
inconsistency: the judicial failure to address in a consistent manner the 
relevance of injury to living beings (such as the mayor in the example 
above) when such living beings are used as signifiers.38 In other words: 
(4) analysis of freedom of expression must address, where appropriate, 
all of the elements of signs and not just the “meaning” component of 
                                                          
33. See infra Part II. Apart from the semiotic concerns addressed in this article, 
content neutrality analysis must address other questions. For example, if one relies 
solely on the functional democracy rationale for First Amendment protections, why 
would content restrictions on purely-private speech run afoul of the First 
Amendment when there is no general impact on public discourse? A marketplace of 
ideas approach also faces potential criticism. To the extent content neutrality 
approaches ground themselves in democratic concerns, the purely-private speech 
points apply. Furthermore, even in the purely public sphere, fraudulent speech, for 
example, has no place in a marketplace seeking truth. Tracing and exploring in detail 
the content-based restrictions permissible under the self-government, marketplace of 
ideas, individual autonomy, self-expression, self-fulfillment, and tolerance rationales 
for First Amendment protections is beyond the scope of this article. 
34. See infra Part II.A. 
35. I of course do not mean to suggest that current First Amendment doctrine 
would allow this practice. I use the example simply to make the logical point. See 
supra note 23, 24. See also infra note 90 for a discussion of the First Amendment’s 
non-protection of violence. 
36. See, e.g., infra Part III.D.2.c. 
37. See Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT.
REV. 81 (2012) (discussing, among other things, Stevens, Snyder, and the Court’s 
general failure to directly address “the issue of speech-created harm” and suggesting 
that the Court may lack “the conceptual and doctrinal arsenal necessary for grappling 
with speech-associated harm.”).
38. See infra Part III.D.2.c. 
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signs. This principle should temper any excess focus of First 
Amendment jurisprudence on content neutrality at the expense of other 
important values such as preventing actual harm to others.39
II. MEANING, SIGNS, SIGNALS, SIGNIFIERS, AND SEMIOTICS 
A. Meaning, Signs and What They Signify 
To lay the groundwork for a more detailed analysis of the 
conceptual shortcomings in both Stevens and Snyder, the following 
examples explore in more depth the three levels of meaning and the use 
of signs to grasp and convey meaning. 
Let us suppose that I erect a statue of John the Fencer to honor 
the man. In so doing, I am not using that statue as an end in itself but to 
indicate something beyond itself, i.e., my opinion about the man. 
Expression in such a case therefore involves something (which I shall 
call the signifier) which intentionally “stand[s] for something else”40
(which I shall call the signified) to someone (the speaker or listener or 
both).41 In that case, the signified would be a reference (the man) which I 
have further refined in discourse with a frame (he is a fencer who is 
either honorable or dishonorable) and which I have further refined with a 
disposition (he is an honorable fencer). Such expression can thus be 
diagrammed as follows: 
                                                          
39. See Heyman, supra note 24, at 141–42. 
40. ROBERT BENSON, THE INTERPRETATION GAME 75 (2007). Thus, for 
example, if a tree’s bark grows in a way that creates a cross on its trunk, that cross is 
not a sign unless someone uses or perceives that mark to convey religious or other 
meaning. See also infra note 41. Intention’s role here explains “[w]hy on a Sunday 
morning, when you awaken at eight o’clock and hear your neighbor mowing his 
lawn you are agitated and angry . . . . but if you hear thunder and lightning you will 
return to your covers and sleep. Only those crazed like Ahab will feel the same 
affront from nature as from a mind—but that is because they see an evil mind behind 
nature.” Bollinger, supra note 24, at 982. 
41. See WINFRIED NOTH, HANDBOOK OF SEMIOTICS 79–80 (1995) for a table of 
various sign terminology, including Saussur’es “signifier” (signfiant) and “signified” 
(signifié). 
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I shall use the term “sign” to refer to this intentional usage of a
signifier and a signified as diagrammed above.42 In such a case, again, 
the words “John the Fencer” are the signifier and the man himself–as
understood by the speaker at least43—is the signified. 
Where we have such a sign, the sign consists of both the signifier 
(e.g., the words “John the Fencer”) and the signified (John the Fencer the 
man as understood by the speaker or listener or both) and should not be 
confused with the signifier alone.44 In this article, I will only use “sign” 
in the semiotic sense of both signifier and signified. 
                                                          
42. According to C.S. Peirce, a founder of pragmatism and one of the founders 
of modern semiotics, a sign must be “something which stands to somebody for 
something in some respect or capacity.” CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED 
PAPERS §2.228 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., Belknap Press 1974). See 
also JOSEPH BRENT, CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE: A LIFE, (1993); CHRISTOPHER 
HOOKWAY, PEIRCE (1992). Furthermore, according to Peirce, “nothing is a sign 
unless it is interpreted as a sign.” CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS
§2.306 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., Belknap Press 1974). According to 
Benson, “[t]he something that [one] says has meaning—it may be words or larger 
units of a text, or sounds, or objects, or feelings, or events in nature, anything that 
stands for something else—will be called a sign.” BENSON, supra note 40, at 78 
(emphasis added). Benson understands meaning itself for a given person on a given 
occasion to be that person’s “experience of [a] series of signs, ending in some mental 
or behavioral event.” Id. at 25. The philosopher John R. Searle succinctly describes 
such necessary “intentionality” as “that property of many mental states and events by 
which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world.” 
JOHN R. SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY 1 (Cambridge 1983). 
43. The “man himself” is not a Kantian “thing-in-itself” but a focal point of 
experience, thought or emotion which is framed for possible categorization and 
perhaps “dispositively” categorized in the manner discussed in this Section. 
44. NOTH, supra note 41, at 79–80. Confusing these terms is of course easy to 
do since we also use “sign” in ordinary speech to mean just the signifier itself. One 
might say, for example, “turn left at the stop sign down the road,” or “I don’t have 
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Consider a slight modification of our hypothetical: If everyone 
agrees that we see John the Fencer, we are referring to a portion of 
common experience (the reference) that we have framed as a fencer and 
determined to be John the Fencer. Conversely, we can have other cases 
where there is actual or potential disagreement at any of these three 
levels. For example, if I alone speak of my good title to Blackacre, I am 
referring to a portion (the reference) of experience that I have framed and 
purportedly determined. I say “purportedly determined” because others 
may dispute both the frame and the disposition. In the case of my claim 
about Blackacre, for example, a communist might dispute the private 
ownership frame that makes such a claim possible while others may 
concede the frame but deny my good title. One might therefore diagram 
the relationship between signifier and signified (i.e., reference, frame, 
and disposition) as follows: 
                                                          
any political signs in my yard.” In such usage, “sign” means the physical object used 
to express traffic rules or political views. 
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Of course, what constitutes reference, frame, and disposition is 
contextual. For example, “Alexander the Great is either guilty or not 
guilty of war crimes in Egypt” is a sign because it has both a reference 
(i.e., the actions he took in Egypt) and a frame of that reference (i.e., he 
is either guilty or not guilty of war crimes). “Alexander the Great is 
guilty of war crimes in Egypt” would include the above reference and 
frame as well as a proposed disposition of the reference within that 
frame. However, “Alexander the Great is guilty of war crimes in Egypt” 
would be the reference or focal point where one is debating the meaning 
of that specific phrase. 
Hence, on the face of things, one can intend that anything stands 
for anything else. Although it may seem silly, there is no reason why, for 
         SIGNIFIER 
Something—anything—
which stands for something 
else to a person/mind.
For example, a statue of John 
the Fencer. 
           SIGNIFIED
The meaning of the signifier, as 
interpreted by a person/mind. 
    1. REFERENCE 
xA focal point of experience.
xFor example, certain visual and 
auditory experiences to be 
categorized.
    2. FRAME 
xThe possible judgments or 
determinations one may 
make about the reference.
xFor example, “this is the sight 
and sound of a fencer.”
   3. DISPOSITION 
xA determination —a resolution 
—which one makes about 
the thing as framed and 
referenced.
xFor example, “this is John the 
Fencer.”
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example, one cannot intend that a tree stand for the moon. However, the 
Court has sometimes appeared to deny this basic truth. In United States 
v. O’Brien,45 the Court rejected “the view that an apparently limitless 
variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging 
in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”46 This seems to me, 
however, to be a confusion of terminology by the Court. Distinguishing 
between signifier and signified, I believe that the Court actually meant to 
say that the First Amendment does not protect the usage of every 
logically-possible signifier in expression in O’Brien, burning a Selective 
Service registration card. This would be consistent with the Court’s 
distinction in the case between “speech” and “nonspeech” elements 
“combined in the same course of conduct.”47 If I am correct, a more 
precise distinction in this latter statement would be between the signified
and signifier used “in the same course of conduct.”48 As we shall see 
below, limitations on usage of certain signifiers (such as living beings 
used as signifiers against their will) are indeed appropriate.49
B. Contrasting Signs and Signals 
Some would also distinguish signals from signs; unlike signs, 
signals (if they exist) simply provoke instant, unreasoned action.50 Like 
signs, such signals would have signifiers; unlike signs, they would lack 
references and frames and thus dispositions (i.e., handlings of the focus 
in the context of the frame).51 For example, some might contend that the 
trembling of the earth can provoke an instant, unreasoned run for cover, 
or a falling box can provoke an instant, unreasoned dash to catch it. If 
                                                          
45. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 




49. See infra Parts II.F, III.D.2.c & IV.B.3. 
50. See Noth’s discussion of various uses of the term “signal” including the 
view that “signals have only a sensory-motor function.” NOTH, supra note 41, at 
112. See also BERNARD S. JACKSON, SEMIOTICS AND LEGAL THEORY 18 (1997) (“A 
signal can be a stimulus that does not mean anything but causes or elicits 
something.”).
51. See NOTH, supra note 41, at 107–13, for a discussion of the ways others 
have used the term “signal.”
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they exist, signals would thus, by definition, be expressionless because 
they would refer to nothing. Instead, again, signals would consist of 
signifiers plus such mere unreasoned action.52
Assuming that such signals do exist,53 would, for example, the 
shouting of “boo!” that provokes an instant, unreasoned fear in the 
addressee be a signal and not expression? Would the adult magazine or 
crush video that provokes instant, unreasoned arousal in the viewer be a 
signal and not expression? 
One might initially respond that fear and arousal are emotions, 
not thoughts, and are thus not expression. This analysis would, however, 
underplay our emotional engagement with the world. The Court itself has 
noted that “words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their 
cognitive force.”54 This emotional engagement with the world has been 
persuasively studied and described,55 and the notion that fear or arousal, 
for example, have no expressive nature is simply incorrect.56 Signal 
theory can therefore supply no easy First Amendment solutions for crush 
video bans even if such videos merely provoke some form of emotion 
such as arousal. This Article shall explore this and related points in more 
detail in Part III.D.1. 
                                                          
52. I personally doubt that such signals exist. I believe that any signifier 
“provoking” an “instant, unreasoned action” would need to do so within the context 
of a conceptual or emotional framework that turns the “signal” into a sign. I believe 
that we jump out of the way of a falling box because we have concepts of “box” and 
“injury” and further believe that we would not jump in the absence of such concepts. 
53. Again, I personally doubt that such signals exist. See See infra Parts II.F, 
III.D.2.c & IV.B.3. 
54. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
55. See generally ROBERT C. SOLOMON, THE PASSIONS: EMOTIONS AND THE 
MEANING OF LIFE (Hacket Publ’g Co. 1993) (particularly Chapter 8: The Emotional 
Register, pages 223-308). See also JACKSON, supra note 50, at 24 (discussing views 
that law “is a collection of symbols capable of evoking ideas and emotions, together 
with the ideas and emotions so evoked.”). Searle also recognized the expressive 
nature of emotions. SEARLE, supra note 42, at 2 (“Undirected anxiety, depression, 
and elation are not Intentional, the directed cases are Intentional.”). Searle in fact set 
out an expansive list of “Intentional states” which includes many emotional ones. Id.
at 34. 
56. See supra note 50. 
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C. Signifier Types and Corresponding Signs 
Returning to signs, we often think of signifiers as verbal (such as 
the words “George Washington” signifying the man himself). However, 
signifiers need not be verbal. A frown, for example, may signify 
disapproval as well as (if not better than) the phrase “I disapprove.” An 
act or thing, therefore, may serve as a signifier. And any useful basic 
typology of signifiers will turn on criteria other than merely verbal ones. 
In this regard, C. S. Peirce57 gives us a useful tripartite typology: 
(1) signifiers that signify by resembling what they signify (iconic 
signifiers such as a bust of John the Fencer); (2) signifiers that signify by 
convention or other arbitrary designation (symbolic signifiers such as the 
words “John the Fencer”); and (3) signifiers that participate in what they 
                                                          
57. A founder of pragmatism and pioneer in semiotics. See, e.g., BRENT, supra 
note 42; HOOKWAY, supra note 42. 
PEIRCE’S THREE TYPES OF SIGNIFIERS
ICONS – a thing (signifier) that 
resembles what it signifies.
xA sculpture of John the fencer 
resembles John the Fencer, the 
man. 
SYMBOLS – A thing (signifier) that 
bears a relation to what it signifies ONLY 
because of some arbitrary designation. 
x“George the Gripper” could elicit 
thoughts of the same man if John 
had been named George and if 
fencing were known as gripping.  
“John the Fencer”
Indexes – a thing (signifier) that signifies 
by participating with what it signifies. 
xA weathervane fashioned in the 
shape of John the Fencer 
indicates wind direction by 
participating in the wind flow.  
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signify (indexical signifiers such as weathervane that indicates the 
direction of the wind).58 As we shall see, the nature of the indexical 
signifier sheds particular light on the Court’s error in Stevens.59 Taking 
each in turn, an icon uses an iconic signifier (i.e., a signifier that 
resembles the signified) to signify a reference, a frame, and possibly a 
disposition. For example, a painting of George Washington crossing the 
Delaware River60 could be used by its owner as an icon, which refers to 
an historical experience, which frames that experience as a river crossing 
and which has a disposition of a brave river crossing. The painting’s 
owner could also use the painting in non-iconic, and thus expressionless, 
ways. For example, the painting’s owner could simply hang it to cover a 
hole in a wall. 
A symbol typically uses a conventional or other arbitrary 
signifier to signify a reference, a frame, and possibly a disposition. For 
example, one may feel warm, weak, and uncomfortable (the reference). 
One may frame that experience as a disease and conclude that one has a 
cold (the disposition). In that case, one’s statement that “I have a cold” 
would be symbolic expression since “I have a cold” gets its meaning 
purely by the conventional usage of such terms.61
                                                          
58. See PEIRCE, supra note 42, at §§ 1-369, 1-372. Strictly speaking, iconic and 
indexical signifiers are in the final analysis actually conventional. What constitutes 
resemblance and participation is a matter of categorization. Since categories 
(including those of similarity and participation) can vary from time to time and place 
to place as convention demands or permits, iconic and indexical signifiers must 
therefore be conventional as well. One might therefore more precisely distinguish 
between three kinds of conventional signifiers: the iconic, indexical and symbolic. 
However, from a lawyer’s perspective, this seems perhaps a needless complexity and 
I have chosen to follow an approach that follows the more “common sense” belief 
that resemblance and participation are something more than simply convention. 
59. See infra Part III.D.2.b. 
60. Cf. Emanuel Leutze, Washington Crossing the Delaware, (1851), available 
at www.ushistory.org/washingtoncrossing/images/washingtoncrossing.jpg. 
61. If one simply utters those words alone in a random and unconscious state, 
they would of course not be symbolic expression by the utterer since no meaning 
was intended or perceived. Others, however, may find meaning in such utterances. I 
explore the distinction between intended and perceived expression below in Part 
II.D. Ideally, the intended and perceived expressions have identical meaning, and 
clarity could be defined as the convergence of both forms of expression in a given 
case.
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Symbols need not only use words as signifiers. They can employ 
anything intended or perceived to operate as a signifier. For example, the 
American flag is an obvious symbol of America, and burning that flag 
can be a symbol for dislike of America or American policy.62 Despite 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s claim that “flag burning is the equivalent of an 
inarticulate grunt or roar that, it seems fair to say, is most likely to be 
indulged in not to express any particular idea, but to antagonize others,” 
the flag can thus be part of quite meaningful symbolic expression.63
However, just as words without intended or perceived meaning are not a 
sign, burning a flag can also be non-symbolic. For example, burning a 
flag can be a proper means of flag disposal and need express nothing in 
such a case.64
An index uses a signifier that signifies by participating in a 
reference, a frame, and possibly a disposition. For example, a 
homeowner concerned about the wind (the reference) can frame the wind 
as something which has direction and can mount a weathervane to 
indicate that direction.65 Such indications, which come from the 
weathervane’s interactions with the wind, would therefore serve as 
dispositions of the references framed.66
In reviewing indexical expression, one should note at the outset 
that indexical signifiers raise problems not always found with iconic and 
symbolic signifiers. Since indexical signifiers participate with what they 
signify, they cannot be analyzed on any purely-speech basis which 
ignores any living signifiers in the indexical relationship. An air quality 
                                                          
62. For example, Gregory Lee Johnson protested the Reagan administration’s 
policies by setting an American flag on fire. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 
(1989). 
63. Id. at 432 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
64. 4 U.S.C. § 8(k) (2006); See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411 (1989) (stating that 
“federal law designates burning as the preferred means of disposing of a flag” that is 
no longer fit for display). 
65. See PEIRCE, supra note 42, at §2.86 (A weathercock is an index of the 
direction of the wind . . . [because] it really takes the self-same direction as the wind 
. . . .”).
66. As in the case of icons and symbols, the weathervane is also not a sign if 
no intended or perceived expression exists. For example, if the homeowner mounts 
the weathervane simply to cover a hole in the roof, the weathervane would not then 
serve as an index for the homeowner. Of course, he could later discover a dual 
purpose in the weathervane and then use it as an index as well. 
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measurer,67 for example, would engage in indexical expression if he 
measures air quality throughout the day by how well a person tethered to 
a stake fares breathing such air. Of course, this would present more than 
just First Amendment issues. As we shall see in more detail below, this 
inherent difference between indexical and other forms of expression 
provides strong support for Justice Alito’s dissent in Stevens.68
D. Intended and Perceived Expression 
How do you like 
my drawing of a 
box?
What box? I 
thought you had 
drawn a “Y.”
Whether expression is symbolic, indexical, or iconic, expression 
can be intended and perceived in different manners.69 For example, the 
owner of the George Washington painting might wish to display it 
proudly as a sign of deep regard for George Washington. Or he may hang 
the painting to merely plug a hole—not intending for the painting to 
signify anything. However, regardless of the owner’s intentions, guests 
in the owner’s home may perceive the painting in ways intended or never 
intended by the owner. For example, some may see the painting as 
merely an expression of an old man. Some may see it as an expression of 
a slave-owning hypocrite. In any case, the painting can have peculiar 
meaning for these persons even when the owner hangs it with a different 
intent or with no expressive purpose at all. As the Court put it in Spence 
v. Washington,70 “[a] person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into 
                                                          
67. Cf. Air Quality Information, Environmental Assistance and Protecion: 
Forsyth County, North Carolina, www.co.forsyth.nc.us/eap/air_quality_info.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2013). 
68. See infra Part III.D.2.b. 
69. As the Court has recognized, it is “often true that one man’s vulgarity is 
another’s lyric.” Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
70. 418 U.S. 405 (1974). 
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it, and what is one man’s comfort and inspiration is another’s jest and 
scorn.”71
Thorough analysis of freedom of expression, therefore, must 
recognize a distinction between intended expression72 and perceived 
expression.73 Of course, for all practical purposes, the two modes of 
expression often do coincide.74 However, when they diverge, the 
divergence can be much more subtle and complex than the examples 
discussed above. 
For example, Robert Benson tells us how modern readers read 
The Wizard of Oz quite differently from how the author originally 
intended it to be read.75 Rather than a coming-of-age fairy tale of good 
and evil, the author wrote the book as a Populist allegory.76 Here are just 
a few examples of the author’s originally-intended allegories: Dorothy as 
the average person; the Yellow Brick Road as the gold standard; 
Dorothy’s silver (not red as in the film) slippers as free silver money; Oz 
as an abbreviation of “ounce” (the measure of gold and silver); the 
Wicked Witch of the East as “capitalists and bankers”; the Tin Man as 
the factory worker; the Scarecrow as the farmer; the Munchkins as “the 
little people”77; the Cowardly Lion as William Jennings Bryan; and the 
Wizard as the President who governs by sleight of hand.78 The author of 
the Wizard of Oz’s original intended meaning are lost on the modern 
reader.79
                                                          
71. Id. at 413 (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 
(1943)). 
72. I.e., the creator’s or owner’s expression of the potential sign.
73. I.e., anyone else’s perceived expression.
74. I am not naïvely claiming that all persons have exactly the same take on 
any piece of expression. There will always be some degree of divergence between 
intended and perceived expression because no one person ever shares the exact same 
perspective as anyone else. However, as we see every day, for purposes of action 
and exchange, speaker and listener can for all practical purposes talk about the same 
thing. 
75. BENSON, supra note 40, at 52–53. 
76. Id. at 52. 
77. Presumably meaning the common people. 
78. BENSON, supra note 40, at 52. 
79. Id. at 52–53. 
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E. When Rights Diverge 
In the case of The Wizard of Oz, the First Amendment protects 
both the intended expression of the author and the perceived expression 
of readers; the author has the right to express his allegory and the people 
have the right to read and take their own message from the book.80
However,what happens when rights in intended and perceived 
expression conflict? Consider a hypothetical: John the Fencer owns a 
rare marble bust of Thomas Jefferson and keeps a jester’s hat on the bust 
as an expression of his contempt for Jefferson. The State sees, at most, 
humorous expression in John the Fencer’s use of the bust, and the State 
wishes to acquire the bust for hatless display in a museum. The State 
offers both fair market value for the bust and an exact marble replica. 
Under these facts, John the Fencer has a First Amendment right to use 
the bust he owns to express his views about Jefferson. Assuming the 
State has the constitutional right to take such property by eminent 
domain for public use,81 it would have the right to take such a bust for 
such museum use. How should we then balance the individual’s and the 
state’s rights here? Is one more important than the other or is there a 
possible solution in the distinction we have made between signifier and 
signified? Should the degree of fungibility of the signifier (i.e., the bust) 
proportionately reduce the strength of John the Fencer’s claim? Should 
we say that no real First Amendment question exists here since John the 
Fencer can continue to make his point by simply putting the jester’s hat 
on the exact reproduction? As we shall see, these kinds of questions play 
a critical role in any thorough analysis of both Stevens and Phelps.82
                                                          
80. See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“The right of freedom of 
speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to 
distribute, the right to receive, the right to read and freedom of inquiry, [and] 
freedom of thought . . . .” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); see also Weaver v. 
Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 242 (1966) (en banc) (“Also encompassed are amusement 
and entertainment as well as the exposition of ideas. . . . ‘What is one man’s 
amusement, teaches another’s doctrine.’” (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 
507, 510 (1948))). 
81. See Warner/Elektra/Atl. Corp. v. Cnty. of DuPage, 991 F.2d 1280, 1285 
(7th Cir. 1993) (“It is rare for American governments to requisition personal 
property, but sometimes they do so and when they do they have to pay just 
compensation.” (citations omitted)). 
82. See infra Parts III, IV. 
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F. Several Further Principles and Conclusions 
For free speech purposes, several corollaries follow from the 
discussion and questions raised above. First, of course, free speech or 
expression issues cannot exist in the absence of signs. (5)83 At the 
beginning of any thorough free speech analysis, one should, therefore, 
first determine whether a sign exists and, if so, one should clarify its 
typology (i.e., clarify the type of sign). If the typology of the sign is not 
clearly understood, the manner in which the sign functions will not be 
understood and this, of course, risks a flawed analysis. 
(6) Where a sign exists, expression will have two to three levels 
of meaning regardless of typology (i.e., a reference and frame and 
possibly a disposition). These levels must be recognized and fully 
protected to the extent required by law. As discussed above,84 any signs 
will, at minimum, have reference and framing levels of meaning which 
deal with the reference at hand and with the manner in which the 
reference is framed. As further discussed above,85 more developed signs 
will also have disposition levels of meaning.86 For example, if the First 
Amendment protects my right to say “we should not have bailed out the 
banks in the Great Recession,” it is protecting my right to point out the 
financial problem that occurred, to frame it as a matter subject either to 
governmental action or inaction, and to handle the reference (i.e., the 
financial problem) by advocating inaction. 
(7) Signs have both intended and perceived meaning, and First 
Amendment protection should therefore apply to both.87 At the same 
time, addressing intended and perceived meaning can present difficulties 
where the intended and perceived meanings differ, and the rights of the 
speaker and audience to their meanings may therefore conflict. 
Understanding the difference between signifier and signified, however, 
might help resolve such conflicts if the conflict turns on the signifier and 
                                                          
83. I continue here the numbering of principles that were started in Part I.C. 
84. See supra Part II.A. 
85. See supra Part II.A. 
86. I.e., determinations of how to handle the focal points or references within 
the context of the frames. 
87. See supra Part II.D. 
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the signifier is reasonably fungible (as in the Jefferson bust example 
discussed above).88
(8) On its face, no expression is unreasonably limited when we 
prohibit intentional and unnecessary use of materially-harmful 
signifiers when reasonably-equivalent, non-harmful signifiers exist.
For example, burning an exact copy of a draft card, rather than the 
official card itself, conveys the same message to the unwitting viewer 
without damaging an official document.89 Similarly, the First 
Amendment should not protect physically knocking down another person 
to indicate disgust for that person because of the risk of injury;90
alternatively, pushing down an image of that person should convey the 
same message of personal disgust without risking the possible harms.91
                                                          
88. See supra Part II.E. 
89. Discussing this iconic alternative would have bolstered the Court’s 
decision upholding a draft card mutilation statute in United States v. O’Brien, 391 
U.S. 367 (1968). Today, it would be easy to make an exact duplicate for burning; but 
even at the time of the case, a folded piece of paper or one in an envelope, for 
example, could perhaps have passed as the real thing before an audience. 
90. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) (“The 
First Amendment does not protect violence.”); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 
__, __, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1598–99 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The First 
Amendment protects freedom of speech, but it most certainly does not protect 
violent criminal conduct, even if engaged in for expressive purposes.”); United 
States v. Mullet, 868 F. Supp. 2d 618, 623 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (“The First 
Amendment has never been construed to protect acts of violence against another 
individual, regardless of the motivation or belief of the perpetrator.”).
91. This is not to say that all signifiers are fungible. An obvious example of 
lack of fungibility would be use of signifiers that uniquely convey emotional 
meaning, such as the case of Mr. Cohen’s “Fuck the Draft” jacket worn in the 
corridors of the Los Angeles County Courthouse in 1968. See Cohen v. California, 
403 U.S. 15 (1971). In that case, Mr. Cohen chose those specific words to express 
publically “the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and the draft.” Id. at 
16. In Mr. Cohen’s case, no living being was forced to participate in or view his 
expressive act—no bystanders were used in any fashion as signifiers and they “could 
effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their 
eyes.” See id. at 21. To give a further more elevated example, Borges notes that 
Dante’s Beatrice “is not a sign of the word faith, she is the sign of the valiant virtue 
and secret illuminations indicated by that word. A sign more precise, richer, and 
more felicitous, than the monosyllabic faith.” JORJE LUIS BORGES, From Allegories 
to Novels, in SELECTED NON-FICTIONS 346 (Eliot Weinberger, ed., Esther Allen, 
trans., Penguin 2000). 
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(9) Finally, and perhaps ironically, balancing rights of the 
parties involved in expression may actually sometimes demand reduced 
fungibility of signifiers. For example, the right to engage in a war protest 
should not include the right to carry a real or apparently-real bomb on 
the street as one’s signifier when an obviously-fake bomb would convey 
an anti-war message without the actual or perceived danger of a real or 
seemingly-real bomb. 92
As we shall see, these principles shed much needed light on the 
Stevens and Phelps cases discussed below. 
III. UNITED STATES V. STEVENS AND THE LIMITS OF INDEXICAL
EXPRESSION 
A. Section 48 and Dogfighting 
[A]bused dogs used in fights endure physical 
torture and emotional manipulation throughout 
their lives to predispose them to violence; common 
tactics include feeding the animals hot peppers and 
gunpowder, prodding them with sticks, and 
electrocution. Dogs are conditioned never to give 
up a fight, even if they will be gravely hurt or 
killed. As a result, dogfights inflict horrific injuries 
on the participating animals, including lacerations, 
ripped ears, puncture wounds and broken bones. 
Losing dogs are routinely refused treatment, beaten 
further as “punishment” for the loss, and executed 
by drowning, hanging, or incineration.93
                                                          
92. See infra Part III.D.2.b.
93. Stevens, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1602 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Brief of Amicus Curiae the Humane Society of the United States in Support of 
Petitioner at 5–6, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (No. 
08-769), 2009 WL 1681460, at *5). The Humane Society brief described other 
dogfighting horrors such as: 
An orchestrated fight to the death where tortured dogs and 
puppies rip the skin and ears off their opponents, and bite 
through each other’s ears, paws, neck and genitals in a 
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Dogfights are illegal in every state and in the District of 
Columbia.94 Like crush videos, some dogfight videos are shot for the sole 
purpose of selling videos of such illegal activity.95 In addition to sales to 
those who simply enjoy watching such cruelty, an illegal betting market 
also exists which is facilitated by such videos.96 Persons who are afraid 
to attend dogfights in person can still bet on them and then watch the 
fights in their homes.97 Such dogfight videos also encourage additional 
illegal activity by serving as training materials for other dogfights.98
As with crush videos, the locations and criminals involved can 
be hidden, making prosecution difficult, if not impossible.99 As with 
crush videos, the producers of such videos can achieve anonymity by use 
of a “bare-boned, clandestine staff.”100
Therefore, Section 48’s goals of addressing both the difficulties 
of prosecuting videoed animal cruelty and the additional crime created 
by such videos should apply to dogfight videos.101 Additionally, Section 
48 should apply to such videos by including in its definitions of 
depictions of animal cruelty videos “in which a living animal is 
intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed, if such 
conduct is illegal under Federal law or the law of the State in which the 
creation, sale, or possession takes place . . . .”102
                                                          
desperate attempt to survive. To avoid impending death, one 
dog rips out the trachea of the other, leaving the dead dog 
sprawled on the ground covered in blood. 
Brief of Amicus Curiae the Humane Society of the United States in Support of 
Petitioner at 5–6, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (No. 
08-769), 2009 WL 1681460, at *2. 
94. Stevens, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1583 (majority opinion). 
95. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1601 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1602. 
99. See id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1601–02. 
100. See id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1601 (citation omitted). 
101. See id., 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1601–02. 
102. 18 U.S.C. § 48(c)(1) (2006). 
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B. Mr. Stevens’ Videos and the Resulting Conviction and Appeals 
Mr. Stevens operated “Dogs of Velvet and Steel” and a related 
website.103 His enterprise sold videos of pit bulls dogfighting.104 He also 
sold videos of dogs attacking other creatures, including wild boar, and 
videos depicting a “‘gruesome scene of a pit bull attacking a domestic 
farm pig.”105
Because of these videos, Mr. Stevens was indicted under Section 
48.106 Mr. Stevens moved to dismiss the charges by claiming that, under 
the First Amendment, Section 48 is facially invalid.107 The District Court 
denied the motion, the jury convicted Mr. Stevens under Section 48 as 
indicted, and Mr. Stevens was thereafter sentenced to imprisonment for 
thirty-seven months with three years of supervised release.108 However, 
on Mr. Stevens’ appeal, the Third Circuit found Section 48 facially 
unconstitutional and vacated his conviction.109
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2009110 and affirmed the 
Third Circuit in 2010.111 Justice Alito was the lone dissenter.112
C. The Road Taken by the Court 
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.113
In Stevens, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, 
concluded that Section 48 was overbroad and, therefore, violated the 
                                                          






109. Id.; United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2008). 
110. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Stevens, 129 S. Ct. 1984
(2009) (No. 08-769). 
111. Stevens, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1592. 
112. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). 
113. ROBERT FROST, COLLECTED POEMS PROSE AND PLAYS 103 (1995). 
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First Amendment.114 As we shall see, the Court reached this conclusion 
by taking odd turns at several forks in the roads of analysis. These were 
turns that the Court need not have taken, and led the Court to reach an 
unfortunate and avoidable result. For those who would see application of 
the law as merely mechanical, the Court’s opinion in Stevens should 
demonstrate the error of their ways. 
The Court acknowledged that a typical facial attack on Section 
48 would place the burden of proof on Mr. Stevens to demonstrate that 
the statute could be valid under “no set of circumstances.”115 In light of 
the crush videos the statute was meant to prevent, this would likely have 
been an impossible burden for Mr. Stevens to overcome.116 Instead, the 
Court turned to “a second type of facial challenge” that can invalidate a 
statute as overbroad if “a substantial number of its applications are 
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate 
sweep.”117
In applying this “second type” of facial challenge, the Court 
found Section 48 to have “alarming breadth.”118 The Court was 
particularly concerned that Section 48(c)(1)’s definition of depictions of 
animal cruelty includes depictions where “a living animal is intentionally
maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed.”119 As the Court put it, 
“‘[m]aimed, mutilated, [and] tortured’ convey cruelty, but ‘wounded’ or 
‘killed’ do not suggest any such limitation.”120
Here, the Court arrived at its first fork in the road. It could have 
easily applied the canon of noscitur a sociis 121 to find that “wounded” 
and “killed” required cruelty since the accompanying words 
“intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured” all involve cruelty.122
                                                          
114. Stevens, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1592. 
115. See id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1587 (citations omitted). 
116. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1592 (leaving an open door on a narrower crush 
video statute). 
117. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1587 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State 
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)). 
118. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1588. 
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. That words are judged by proximate words. See BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
122. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); see also S.D. Warren Co. 
v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 378 (2006) (“The canon, noscitur a sociis, 
LLOYDBN3.DOC 1/13/2014 9:24 AM 
2013] SEMIOTICS OF FREE EXPRESSION  265 
However, the Court rejected this common sense path in favor of a 
harsher one. As the Court explained the options at this first fork in the 
road: 
The Government contends that the terms 
[“wounded” and “killed” used in the phrase 
“intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, 
wounded, or killed” under the heading of
“depiction of animal cruelty”] should be read to 
require the additional element of “accompanying 
acts of cruelty” . . . . The Government bases this 
argument on the definiendum, “depiction of animal 
cruelty,” . . . and on “the commonsense canon of 
noscitur a sociis” . . . . As that canon recognizes, an 
ambiguous term may be “given more precise 
content by the neighboring words with which it is 
associated” . . . . Likewise, an unclear definitional 
phrase may take meaning from the term to be 
defined . . . . 
But the phrase “wounded . . . or killed” at issue 
here contains little ambiguity . . . . Nothing about 
that meaning requires cruelty . . . . 123
Ignoring the other fork in the road, the Court thus chose the 
ironically crueler route that “wounded . . . or killed” has “little 
ambiguity” and that these words should therefore be read “according to 
their ordinary meaning” and “[n]othing about that meaning requires 
cruelty.”124 Of course, as the Court itself noted above and as we further 
discuss below, by virtue of the very placement of the words, the statute 
can just as well be read to require cruelty where the Court finds it 
lacking.125 However, having chosen to construe the words in the manner 
it did, the Court could then review some of the parade of horribles that 
followed. For example, under the Court’s reading, even a video of the 
“humane slaughter of a stolen cow” would be covered by Section 48 
                                                          
reminds us that ‘a word is known by the company it keeps’, and is invoked when a 
string of statutory terms raises the implication that the ‘words grouped in a list 
should be given related meaning.’” (citations omitted)). 
123. Stevens, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1588. (citations omitted). 
124. Id.
125. See infra Part III.D. 
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because no cruelty need be involved.126 The Court further discussed the 
popularity of hunting, how state laws vary on how one may hunt, and 
how Section 48 would therefore potentially create massive confusion 
across state lines.127 As a result, the Court found that, as demand for 
“hunting depictions” exceeds “by several orders of magnitude” demand 
for crush or dogfighting depictions, much more legitimate expression 
than illegitimate expression would be prohibited under Section 48.128
Next, the Court arrived at a second fork in the road. Section 
48(b) provides that Section 48(a) does not apply to “any depiction that 
has serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, 
historical, or artistic value.”129 The Court found most hunting videos lack 
obvious instructional value, apparently believing that many have no more 
than “recreational” value.130 Of course, “recreational value” is not one of 
the categories in Section 48(b) and owners of hunting videos that depict 
wounding or killing of animals would therefore be criminals under 
Section 48.131 However, as we shall see below,132 the Court could have 
just as easily found that hunting videos indeed fell in one or more of the 
categories of exceptions if they had the “serious” value required by 
Section 48(b).133
On the question of “serious” value, the Court arrived at its third 
fork in the road and once more chose an avoidable route. Again, Section 
48(b) provides that Section 48(a) does not apply to “any depiction that 
has serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, 
historical, or artistic value.”134 The Court apparently interpreted “serious” 
                                                          
126. Stevens, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1588. The cow must be stolen, of 
course, because the underlying videoed conduct must be unlawful. 
127. See id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1589. 
128. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1589. 
129. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1590 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 48(b) (2006)). 
130. Id.
131. See id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1588. 
132. See infra Part III.D. 
133. 18 U.S.C. §48(b) (2006). 
134. Stevens, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct at 1590 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 48(b) 
(2006)). 
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to mean something like “significant and of great import.”135 As the Court 
put it: 
The Government’s attempt to narrow the statutory 
ban [of Section 48 by reading “serious” to mean, 
for example, “not scant”] . . . requires an 
unrealistically broad reading of the exceptions 
clause [containing the term “serious”]. As the 
Government reads the clause, any material with 
“redeeming societal value,” . . . “at least some 
minimal value,” . . . or anything more than “scant 
social value,” . . . is excluded under [the exceptions 
clause of] § 48(b). But the text says “serious” 
value, and “serious” should be taken seriously. We 
decline . . . to regard as “serious” anything that is 
not “scant.” (Or, as the dissent puts it, “trifling” . . . 
.)136
The Court’s conclusion here, however, is of course not required 
by common language usage. As Justice Alito pointed out, “serious” can 
also mean “not trifling.”137 However, the Court chose not to follow 
Justice Alito’s route and analyzed Section 48 accordingly. Choosing 
instead to take the route that Section 48(b)’s exceptions applied only to 
matters which are “significant and of great import,”138 the Court of 
course had little difficulty finding grave problems with Section 48.139
Since most of what we do, read, or view is not “of great import,” the 
Court thus chose a route that eviscerated much of Section 48(b).140
Having found Section 48 to apply to woundings and killings 
lacking cruelty,141 and having found “serious” to mean something like 
“significant and of great import,”142 it is hard to see how most (if any) 
                                                          
135. Id. The Court obtained this language from the District Court’s jury 
instructions which the government defended as “a commonly accepted meaning of 
the word ‘serious.’” Id.
136. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1590 (citations omitted). 
137. Id. at ___ n.4, 130 S. Ct. at 1595 n.4 (Alito, J., dissenting). See also
AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1245 (3d ed. 1993). 
138. Stevens, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1590. 
139. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1590–92. 
140. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1590. 
141. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1588. 
142. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1590. 
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hunting videos would fit under any 48(b) exception.143 Since the market 
for hunting videos is much greater than the market for crush videos, the 
Court then had little difficulty finding the statute overbroad.144
In addition to the language of Section 48 itself, Chief Justice 
Roberts also expressed external concerns about damaging the work ethic 
of Congress. As he put it, a different interpretation of Section 48 would 
“sharply diminish” the incentive of Congress to pass a well-worded 
statute.145
Of course, the paths taken by the Court here were alternative 
ones that the Court could have rejected at each of the three forks 
discussed above.146 In fact, not only could the Court have taken different 
routes, it should have taken different routes. In Section D, we shall 
explore the basic principles the Court violated in taking its turns at the 
three forks. We shall then further explore how semiotics helps to explain 
how the Court unfortunately harmed free expression analysis, harmed the 
poor animals involved, and harmed the public who must suffer the 
additional criminal activity the animal cruelty videos generate.147
In fact, this reasoning about the language of Section 48 and the 
work ethic of Congress seems strangely at odds with other statutory 
interpretation principles elucidated by Chief Justice Roberts. As Chief 
Justice Roberts wrote in 2012 when upholding the Affordable Care 
Act148 by finding that its “penalty” meant “tax”:
The text of a statute can sometimes have more than 
one possible meaning. To take a familiar example, 
a law that reads “no vehicles in the park” might, or 
might not, ban bicycles in the park. And it is well 
established that if a statute has two possible 
meanings, one of which violates the Constitution, 
                                                          
143. 18 U.S.C. §48(b) (2006). 
144. Stevens, 559 U.S. at ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1589, 1592. 
145. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1592. 
146. The Court somewhat imperiously stated, “Our construction of § 48 
decides the constitutional question.” Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1592. One would wish 
for a more respectful view of separation of powers that seeks to understand and 
implement the statute’s clear purpose of addressing videos of true animal cruelty.
147. See id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1601–02 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
148. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered volumes and sections of U.S.C.). 
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courts should adopt the meaning that does not do 
so . . . . 
The question is not whether that is the most natural 
interpretation . . . but only whether it is a “fairly 
possible” one. As we have explained, “every 
reasonable construction must be resorted to, in 
order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”149
The Chief Justice further chastised the dissent in the Affordable 
Care Act case for in effect contending that “the law must be struck down 
because Congress used the wrong labels.”150
In light of Chief Justice Roberts’ views in the Affordable Care 
Act, how does one account for Chief Justice Roberts’ apparent failure to 
practice in Stevens what he preached in 2012? Perhaps the words from 
2012 mark an evolution in Chief Justice Roberts’ thinking. If so, perhaps 
he would now agree with the alternative analysis that follows, an analysis 
driven by a better understanding of semiotics that should have led to a 
more enlightened outcome in Stevens.
D. The Road Not Taken 
1. Signals or Signs Along the Road? 
Before addressing the semiotics of statutory construction in this 
case, a proper analysis should first determine whether animal cruelty 
videos could be construed as signals or signs. For if they function as 
signals, they express nothing and are thus subject to no First Amendment 
protection.151
One might argue, for example, that crush videos bought solely 
for arousal express nothing. Rather, one might argue that crush videos 
merely provoke instant, unreasoned acts of arousal. Either way, since 
crush videos only foster an incoherent, emotional response, they would 
                                                          
149. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 
2566, 2593–94 (2012) (internal citations omitted). 
150. Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2597 (discussing the terms “tax” and “penalty”).
151. See supra Part II.B, and the discussion of the unlikely existence of such 
signals. 
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signify nothing because they would have no reference, frame, or 
disposition—and would thus express nothing. Since crush videos express 
nothing, they would have no First Amendment protection, making 
subsequent analysis irrelevant. 
This argument, however, has fatal problems. First, even if true 
signals could exist, even if the producers of crush videos intended them 
to be merely signals, and even if they were always perceived only as 
something arousing, arousal is more than mere physical reaction. As we 
have seen, emotions involve their own forms of expression and 
interaction with the world,152 and even under this scenario crush videos 
would be more than mere signals. Second, the fact that Congress and 
animal rights activists wished to ban crush videos because of the animal 
cruelty involved shows that they at least perceived the videos as 
depictions of animal cruelty and thus as more than mere signals. One 
would also imagine that an ordinary person accidentally buying and 
watching such a video would also see expressions of animal cruelty. 
Perceived expression is no less expression than intended expression,153
and crush videos, therefore, involve more than mere expressionless 
signals. As such, no simple First Amendment solutions exist along these 
lines. 
2. The Semiotics of Statutory Construction 
a. The Vacuum of Plain Meaning 
As the review of the nature of signs indicated in Section II.A. 
above, statutory expression involves three levels of meaning: reference 
meaning, frame meaning, and disposition meaning.154 A thorough 
analysis of any statutory expression should review all three levels of 
meaning. As these levels of meaning are all interrelated, it of course 
makes no sense to review one level of meaning apart from the other 
                                                          
152. See supra Part II.B. 
153. See supra Part II.D. 
154. See Harold Anthony Lloyd, “Original” Means Old, “Original” Means 
New: An Original Look at What “Originalists” Do, 67 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 135 
(2010) (discussing the need to review all three levels of meaning in construction). 
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two.155 In other words, we must do more than merely parse the words of 
Section 48 to find its meaning. A proper review of Section 48 must 
include an intertwined review of the purpose of the statute (in this 
context the reference level of meaning), the language of the statute (in 
this context the frame of that reference), and the handling of the 
reference or parts thereof156 in ways permitted by the frame (in this 
context the disposition level of meaning).157
As to the purpose of the statute, there can be little doubt that the 
statute seeks to prohibit depictions of live animal cruelty except in the 
cases enumerated in Section 48(b). As the Court itself recognizes, 
Section 48 is titled “[d]epiction of animal cruelty.”158 From the title 
alone, there is little room for doubt that the purpose of the statute is to 
address depictions of animal cruelty. Thus, the Court stated at the outset 
of its opinion that Congress enacted Section 48 “to criminalize the 
commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal 
cruelty.”159 As legislative history accords with this,160 it should be 
indisputable at this point that Section 48 addresses cruelty and not, for 
example, the humane slaughter of a cow.161
Moving next to the frame level of meaning (i.e., the text of the 
statute itself) in light of the statute’s purposes, it is puzzling that the 
Court took the three roads discussed above, all three of which should 
have been roads “less travelled by” if courts are to engage in meaningful 
                                                          
155. See supra Part II.A. 
156. In the case of statutory application, disposition of the reference as 
permitted by the frame often includes disposition of parts rather than the whole of 
the reference. For example, if the focus of the statute is upon all animal cruelty 
videos, a case involving only crush videos can still involve a disposition of that 
subset of animal cruelty videos. 
157. As noted in Part II.A, meaning is contextual, and our analysis here 
presupposes a prior question: “How does one determine the meaning of Section 48?”
In the context of that question, the language of the statute is the reference, the frame 
recognizes the three levels of meaning, and the disposition provides that the statutory 
language, viewed in light of the focus or purpose of the statute, determines the 
statute’s meaning.
158. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. __, ___ n.1, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1582 n.1 
(2010) (majority opinion) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 48). 
159. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1582. 
160. See id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1598 (Alito, J., dissenting) (providing Justice 
Alito’s overview of such legislative history). 
161. See id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1588 (majority opinion). 
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statutory interpretation.162 First, Section 48(c)(1)’s caption “depiction of 
animal cruelty,” leaves little if any reasonable doubt that the words 
“wounded” or “killed” require the cruelty lacking in such things as the 
humane slaughter of a stolen cow.163 The Court itself has conceded that 
Section 48 is about depictions of cruelty.164 Second, since the words 
“wounding” and “killing” cannot be viewed apart from the stated 
purpose of the statute, it is clear that the Court erred in not applying 
noscitur a sociis165 to read the words as “cruel wounding” and “cruel 
killing” or the like.166 The Court simply chose the wrong road at this first 
fork. 167
The Court also chose the wrong road at its second fork when it 
found no clear exception category in Section 48(b) for hunting videos.168
Remembering that meaning includes both intended and perceived 
meaning,169 hunting videos can easily be intended or perceived to fall in 
every exception category. Those who believe in gun and hunting rights 
could see hunting videos as valuable political statements. Those who 
                                                          
162. FROST, supra note 113, at 103. 
163. See Stevens, 559 U.S. at ___, ___  n.4, 130 S. Ct. at 1588, 1588 n.4 (citing 
18 U.S.C. § 48(c)(1)). 
164. See id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1587–88. 
165. See supra note 121. 
166. Construction canons are often much maligned. See HUHN, THE FIVE 
TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 22–25, 101–02 (2d ed. 2008). This example shows how 
such attacks are misplaced. A canon of construction is properly used where it 
reconciles issue and frame meaning. Canons should not be applied when they do not 
reconcile such meanings. Had the purpose of Section 48 been to include depictions 
of humane killings and woundings as well, then noscitur a sociis would be 
inappropriate. It is thus specious to attack canons on the grounds that for each canon 
there is an opposite canon. See id. at 102. 
167. Not only would members of Congress presumably want their statute to 
achieve its purpose, they can also always revise the statute should the Court 
improperly resolve an ambiguity. See id. at 128. Requiring Congressional remedial 
action is surely less draconian than striking down the entire statute and breathing life 
back into the crush video market. See Stevens, 559 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1598 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“Now, after the Third Circuit’s decision [facially invalidating 
the statute], crush videos are already back online” (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae 
the Humane Society of the United States in Support of Petitioner at 2, United States 
v. Stevens, 559 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (No. 08-769), 2009 WL 1681460, at 
*5)). 
168. Stevens, 559 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1590. 
169. See supra Part II.D. 
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study hunting methods or enjoy hunting could see hunting videos as 
having scientific and educational value.170 Those who report on hunting 
or hunting videos could find them to have journalistic value. Those who 
study filming methods could see artistic value in hunting videos. Those 
who have religious objections to hunting might find films have religious 
value in their ability to convert others to such a religious view. Finally, 
since some hunting videos could be filmed to record the history of a 
special hunt, hunting videos can also have historical value.171 It is 
therefore hard to imagine anyone interested in hunting videos not falling 
into one or more of these categories in these or other ways. 
In fact, if any drafting problems occur with the statute here, they 
might seem to run in the opposite direction of swallowing up the statute. 
Fortunately for the animals, however, the exceptions also include the 
requirement of “value.”172 Among the various definitions of “value” is 
“merit.”173 Given the ethical dimensions of the term “merit,”174
understanding “value” in such a way would make sense in a statute 
passed to reduce animal cruelty. Thus, since moral justification would be 
lacking under this reasonable interpretation of “value,” mere animal 
cruelty should not fall under any exception of Section 48(b). 
Continuing on in its confused journey, the Court also chose the 
wrong road at the third fork discussed above. Rejecting claims that 
“serious” in Section 48(b) means “not trifling,” the Court appeared to 
                                                          
170. Stevens, 559 U.S.  at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1595 (Alito, J., dissenting) (adding 
educational and scientific categories as well). 
171. To play the dictionary game as well, “historical” can simply mean “based 
on or concerned with events in history.” AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE 
DICTIONARY 644 (3d ed. 1993). To continue the game, Congress did not use the term 
“historic” which implies importance in history. Id. Instead, they used “historical” 
which “refers to whatever existed in the past, whether regarded as important or not.” 
Id.
172. 18 U.S.C. § 48(b) (2006) (requiring items to have “serious religious, 
political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value” in order to 
qualify for exception from the law). 
173. AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 853 (3d ed. 1993). 
174. Among the various definitions of “merit” are “a quality deserving praise 
or approval” and “virtue.” Id. at 853. These definitions are inconsistent with mere 
animal cruelty. 
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settle on a meaning in the range of “significant and of great import.”175
The Court even seemed to find humor in its choice of roads, stating: “the 
text says ‘serious’ and ‘serious’ should be taken seriously.”176 Of course, 
on its face this understanding of “serious” cannot be right in light of the 
purpose of Section 48. Again, most of what we do is not “significant and 
of great import.”177 This is equally true of the ordinary videos that we 
often watch. It is also hard to imagine how many hunting videos would 
be “significant and of great import.”178 This, however, does not bring the 
statute down. It brings down the inappropriate definition of “serious” 
chosen by the Court. 
The other course not taken, the course of defining “serious” as 
meaning “not trifling,”179 would allow Section 48(b)’s exceptions to be 
both meaningful and constitutional. Since frame and reference levels of 
meaning are intertwined,180 and since the purpose of a statute seeking to 
reduce animal cruelty would not be served by an avoidable reading that 
invalidates the statute, the Court’s histrionic definition of “serious” is 
simply not reasonable. Instead, Justice Alito’s understanding of “serious” 
as meaning “not trifling”181 reasonably accords with the purposes of 
Section 48 while allowing the statute to pass constitutional muster. 
In analyzing these roads not taken, we can also see a further 
principle of interpretation that flows from the intertwined nature of frame 
and reference. Since the words and focuses of statutes are intertwined, 
and since statutes frame their reference or focus, it is illogical to read 
statutes in avoidable ways that bring statutes down. Such avoidable 
readings run counter to the way focus, frame, and disposition should 
work together rather than in opposition. Where legislation may be 
construed in multiple ways, courts should therefore construe statutes to 
be both constitutional and well drafted to the extent possible in light of 
                                                          
175. Stevens, 559 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1590 (majority opinion). This is 
apparently a “gotcha” definition arising from the District Court’s jury instructions to 
which the Government apparently consented. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1590. 
178. See id.
179. Which is a perfectly acceptable definition of “serious.” See AMERICAN 
HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1245 (3d ed. 1993). 
180. See supra Part II.A. 
181. Stevens, 559 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1595 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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the purpose and words of the statutes.182 In this case, the Court’s 
proclamation that it would not “rewrite” Section 48 to make it 
constitutional therefore makes no sense.183 Instead, looking at all three 
levels of the statute’s meaning, the Court effectively “rewrote” Section 
48 to make it unconstitutional. 
A correct reading of Section 48 in light of its stated purpose 
provides a conservative (and perhaps too conservative) statute that only 
bans depictions of animal cruelty that lack even trifling religious, 
political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value. 
On this reading, it is hard to imagine how the relation of invalid 
applications of Section 48 to valid applications of Section 48 could be 
substantial and thus support a facial challenge that the statute is 
overbroad.184
b. The Unique Case of Indexicals 
Were this not problematic enough for the Court, a good grasp of 
semiotics also shows a further unique problem with videos of this type. 
Because photography and videotaping involve the interaction of the 
subject with the recording medium, they are straightforward examples of 
indexical expression.185
Child pornography, crush videos, and cockfighting and 
dogfighting videos are all members of the same subset of indexical 
expression. All three involve: (1) Usage of the children, dogs, and other 
animals as a part of the very creation of the indexicals; and (2) Material, 
unjustified harm to those so used. 
Such indexical expression thus involves more than issues of pure 
expression. The Court in New York v. Ferber recognized this point in the 
case of child pornography.186 Reaffirming Ferber, the Court 
                                                          
182. Justice Alito was thus correct where he asserted, in this case at least, that 
the Court has a duty to construe the statute “so as to avoid serious constitutional 
concerns.” Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1597 (Alito, J., dissenting).. See also id. at ___, 
130 S. Ct. at 1595 (“When a federal court is dealing with a federal statute challenged 
as overbroad, it should, of course, construe the statute to avoid constitutional 
problems . . . .” (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n.24 (1982))). 
183. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1592 (majority opinion). 
184. Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1587. 
185. See supra Part II.C. 
186. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982). 
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subsequently stated in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition187 that “[w]here 
the images are themselves the product of child sexual abuse, Ferber
recognized that the State had an interest in stamping it out without regard 
to any judgment about its content.”188
c. The Indexical Harm Exception 
Understanding that the child pornography exception turns on the 
indexical nature of such expression, a more precise statement of the 
underlying principle in Ferber does not require children as subjects. 
Instead, it turns upon the harm inflicted on more than just children. For 
example, adult pornography involving the murder of adults (“snuff 
videos”) would also fall outside the First Amendment.189 Both a secret 
voyeuristic video filmed and distributed without the subject’s consent 
and a secret sex video of a gay college student filmed and distributed 
without his consent and leading to his suicide, should therefore also fall 
outside the First Amendment.190
Precisely put, the indexical question in Stevens is whether the 
scope of protected indexical signifiers should include animals as well as 
                                                          
187. 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
188. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002). 
189. Although there is doubt whether any of these “snuff” films actually exist, 
(see Barbara Mikkelson, A Pinch of Snuff, SNOPES.COM (Oct. 31, 2006),
http://www.snopes.com/horrors/madmen/snuff.asp), any such films would be outside 
the scope of First Amendment protection since the Court has plainly stated that 
“[t]he First Amendment does not protect violence.” NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware 
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982). 
190. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-189aa–189b (West 2012) 
(criminalizing both voyeurism and the dissemination of voyeuristic material as Class 
D felonies). In March 2012, Dharun Ravi was convicted of fifteen crimes including 
invasion of privacy and bias intimidation, and sentenced to thirty days in jail for 
secretly videotaping and distributing intimate scenes of his gay roommate. Michael 
Koenigs et al., Rutgers Trial: Dharun Ravi Sentenced to 30 Days in Jail, ABC NEWS
(May 21, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/rutgers-trial-dharun-ravi-sentenced-30-
days-jail/story?id=16394014; Verdict Sheet, State v. Ravi, No. 1100400596, 2011 
WL 7562705 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2011). On at least two occasions, Ravi used 
a webcam to spy on his male roommate during his roommate’s private romantic 
encounter with another male. See Ian Parker, The Story of a Suicide, NEW YORKER,
Feb. 6, 2012, at 39, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting 
/2012/02/06/120206fa_fact_parker. On one occasion, Ravi used his Twitter account 
to solicit others to view a feed of the webcam. See id.
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humans (children and adults). It should. Animals also clearly feel pain,191
and unjustified pain on its face is undesirable.192 Good government, by 
definition, seeks to minimize unjustified pain within its jurisdiction,193
which means that the underlying rule of Ferber applies to more than 
underage human beings alone.194
In fact, understanding how signs work also helps demonstrate the 
potential speech neutrality of this more precise statement of the rule 
underlying Ferber. Portrayals of both animal torture and child 
pornography need not be indexical. The same kind of expression can be 
conveyed iconically (i.e., by imitation) and symbolically (i.e., by 
words).195 Computer-generated videos of animal torture, dogfights, and 
child pornography can express such things by fictional imitation and 
resemblance without causing any pain to an animal or child. The Court 
has, in fact, expressly upheld the right to produce non-obscene virtual 
child pornography for this very reason.196 Other iconic (i.e., resemblance) 
                                                          
191. That animals felt pain was recognized by many at least as early as the 
Eighteenth Century. See KEITH THOMAS, MAN AND THE NATURAL WORLD 175–78 
(Pantheon Books 1983). This was a welcome contrast to the earlier Seventeenth 
Century views of at least some Cartesians. These Cartesians believed that animals 
were mere automata and that “the cry of a beaten dog was no more evidence of the 
brute’s suffering than was the sound of an organ proof that the instrument felt pain 
when struck. Animal howls and writhings were merely external reflexes, 
unconnected with any inner sensation.” Id. at 33. 
192. Pain is “[a]n unpleasant sensation varying in severity, resulting from 
injury, disease, or emotional disorder.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE 
DICTIONARY 999 (4th ed. 2007). 
193. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl. (including “promote the general Welfare”).
194. For a detailed analysis of the compelling governmental interest in 
preventing animal cruelty, see Perdue, supra note 11, at 494–501. 
195. The Court recognized the possibility of iconic substitution in the case of 
child pornography, recognizing that “the value of using children in these works (as 
opposed to simulated conduct or adult actors) was de minimus.” United States v. 
Stevens, 559 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586. (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 
U.S. 747, 756–57, 762 (1982)). Justice Alito further addressed the very point that 
symbolic and iconic avenues remained open, stating that “the statute does not apply 
to verbal descriptions or to simulations.” Id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1600 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). Animal torture, dogfights, and child pornography can be expressed 
iconically and also symbolically through written depictions of fictional subjects that 
suffer no injury at all. 
196. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 250–51 (2002) (finding 
unconstitutional a statute which “prohibits speech that records no crime and creates 
no victims by its production,” noting that “[v]irtual child pornography is not 
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substitutions for real animals could of course include usage of realistic 
imitations of the animals along with the necessary fake blood and 
imitation screams. 
The fungibility of either the virtual or imitation approaches here 
is heightened by the extremely-fungible nature of arousal expression 
itself. For example, pornography requires images of certain attributes 
that arouse the particular viewer, and this does not necessarily require 
images of specific, and only those specific, persons with the desired 
attributes. This point would apply even more in the case of crush videos 
since the viewer knows nothing about the particular animal involved in 
the video. 
A more precise statement of the injury principle (or at least one 
of the principles) involved in Ferber would therefore seem to be: The 
First Amendment does not protect indexical expression (1) where the 
speaker unjustifiably197 uses198 a living199 human or other animal as an 
                                                          
‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of children,” and further noting that 
“Ferber’s judgment about child pornography was based upon how it was made, not 
on what it communicated”).
197. Justification in this context requires a discussion well beyond the limits of 
this article. However, to give a couple of examples, justification under this first part 
of the exception could include filming a murder to provide evidence to police and 
studying a murder video as a part of forensics instruction. In an attempt to build a 
more general justification formula, one might return to 1942 and build in part on a 
previous formula of the Court and ask whether “any benefit that may be derived 
from [the expression] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). As the breadth 
of “order and morality” may cause concern, a better formulation of this principle 
might be: “protection is denied only when the speech value is ‘clearly outweighed’ 
by the harm the utterance causes.” David Crump, Desecration: Is It Protected 
Speech?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1021, 1023–24 (2011) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 
U.S. at 572). For a general discussion of the need to understand the relationship 
between harm and the First Amendment, see Schauer, supra note 37. See also infra
Part IV.B.3. 
198. Like meaning, use can be intentional (e.g., the maker of a crush video) or 
perceived (e.g., the distributor or purchaser who uses or distributes a video as a crush 
video). Furthermore, use of force should not be a necessary component of “use” 
because non-human animals cannot consent and there are certain activities (such as 
murder) to which human victims cannot consent. See, e.g., People v. Minor, 898 
N.Y.S.2d 440, 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (“[T]he law does not permit a person to 
consent to his own murder. That consent does not transform an active killing of 
another into a suicide.”); People v. Gray, 224 Cal. App. 2d 76, 79–80 (1964) (“[I]t is 
no defense to assert that the victim consented to an assault upon her by force likely 
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indexical signifier, and (2) where the living human or other animal 
suffers unjustified, material harm as a result of such use. 
The “use” in the first element covers not only those who 
originally filmed the indexical expressions, but also those who otherwise 
use the film or other videos of the underlying action.200 The latter 
category would include, for example, those who copy or distribute crush 
videos as well as opportunists who also directly use the indexical 
victims. Thus, if B videotapes an animal crushing that A is conducting 
and is videotaping as well (with or without knowledge of B’s activity), 
the first element would apply to the videos of both A and B. 
The phrasing of the second element narrows the sweep of the 
exception. If the harm is not material or is justified, the exception should 
not apply. For example, if one traps a bird briefly to photograph its 
beauty and does not harm the bird, this expression should be protected.201
If, however, the bird is materially harmed in making the video and there 
is no acceptable justification for such harm, both the video and its 
inseparable underlying act should be subject to state response since such 
                                                          
to produce great bodily harm.”); see also W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Consent as 
Defense to Criminal Assault and Battery, 58 A.L.R.3d 662, § 2[a] (1974) (“Although 
the cases are replete with broad general statements that consent is a defense in a 
prosecution for assault, most of these statements are drawn from cases involving 
sexual assaults of one kind or another, and in the few cases which have involved an 
actual battery, without sexual overtones, the courts have usually taken the view that 
since the offense in question involved a breach of the public peace as well as an 
invasion of the victim's physical security, the victim's consent would not be 
recognized as a defense, at least where the battery is a severe one.” (footnotes 
omitted)). Where human consent is permissible, such consent can be considered 
under justification as can the application of any force. 
199. Using dead humans or other animals is beyond the scope of this article 
and will not be addressed. 
200. This wide net captures all who intentionally participate in the production, 
distribution and “enjoyment” of such videos; the issue of justification is then 
addressed separately. 
201. This is not to say, of course, that briefly “trapping” a child for such 
purpose would be harmless even if the child suffers no physical or mental injury. As 
a potential tort of false imprisonment, such an action in itself could be a material 
harm. See, e.g., Drabek v. Sabley, 142 N.W.2d 798 (Wis. 1966) (holding that 
defendant’s conduct was unreasonable as a matter of law where defendant put a boy 
into his automobile, while only a few yards from the boy’s home, and drove the boy 
to a police station). 
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harmful expression could, for example, be replaced by other harmless 
indexical expression or by iconic or symbolic expression. 
This is not to say, however, that justification would 
automatically exist in the absence of easy or reasonable fungibility. First, 
the very concept of reasonable fungibility must take into account the 
harm caused to the living signifier.202 This must broaden the universe of 
the acceptable since it might well be very reasonable to accept some 
imperfect fungibility to avoid severe harm to the living signifier.203 This 
necessarily involves a balancing of rights, and there is no reason the 
speaker’s right should always prevail regardless of the injury to the 
living signifier. Second, even if no reasonable fungible alternative exists 
on this analysis, justification must still weigh the rights of the speaker 
against the rights of the living signifier not to suffer serious injury.204
Again, there is no reason why the speaker’s right should always trump in 
such a case, and courts should not hide behind the cover of “content 
neutrality” to avoid doing their job.205
Of course, the elements of harm, materiality, and justification in 
the indexical exception formulated here can often be controversial and, 
much like the concept of “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth 
Amendment,206 can evolve over time.207 For example, the justification 
                                                          




205. Or they should not, as Heyman puts it, “short-circuit this inquiry by 
invoking the content neutrality doctrine.” Heyman, supra note 24, at 142. Instead, 
they “should engage in a careful consideration of the values on both sides.” Id.
206. See supra note 197 on the scope of the justification element. See also 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (noting that the words of the Eighth 
Amendment are neither precise nor standard in scope. Thus, “[t]he Amendment must 
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”). Compare, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) 
(holding that the imposition of the death penalty on persons sixteen or seventeen 
years of age does not offend the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment), with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the imposition of the death penalty on 
persons who were under the age of eighteen when they committed a crime). 
207. For example, in the 1640s, those who wished to kill animals merely for 
pleasure could cite the Bible and “man’s charter of dominion over the creatures.” 
THOMAS, supra note 191, at 22. “Of bear-baiting and cock-fighting they could say: 
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element addresses such concerns as the hunting videos with which the 
Court in Stevens expressed such angst.208 As long as hunting is 
permissible, the justification element will generally protect hunting 
videos. If hunting itself or certain hunting practices become 
impermissible, then the justification element will no longer protect 
videos of such activities. This, however, would not prohibit expression 
since iconic replacement videos can take their place as can symbolic 
descriptions of the activities. The justification element would similarly 
address such other issues, such as, for example, the greater latitude that 
should apply to distribution of videotapes of public figures.209
In any case, the indexical-harm exception formulated here is 
fully consistent with United States v. O’Brien.210 Addressing First 
Amendment issues where “speech” and “nonspeech” elements were 
combined “in the same course of conduct,” the O’Brien Court held: 
[A] sufficiently important interest in regulating the 
nonspeech element can justify incidental 
limitations on First Amendment freedoms . . . . [A] 
government regulation is sufficiently justified if it 
is within the constitutional power of the 
Government; if it furthers an important or 
substantial governmental interest; if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental 
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is 
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of 
that interest.211
The Court in Stevens did not question the power of the states to 
regulate animal cruelty.212 Additionally, the Court in Stevens did not 
                                                          
‘Christianity gives us a placard to use these sports.’” Id. The very passage of Section 
48 shows how far common wisdom has moved from such earlier notions. 
208. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1590
(2010). 
209. As demonstrated in Part IV.B.3, infra, restrictions on using humans and 
other live animals as signifiers does not typically create, among other things, public 
forum, religious discrimination, freedom of association, or satire issues. 
210. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
211. Id. at 376–77. 
212. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1595
(2010) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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question the important governmental interests involved, including 
reduction of crime generated by such cruelty.213 Furthermore, prohibiting 
usage of live animals in filming is not based upon expression; the 
prohibition is based upon cruelty to the animals and the resulting 
criminal activity generated.214 Finally, prohibiting animal cruelty by 
prohibiting use of live animals is no broader than necessary to achieve 
that goal.215 Thus, none of these O’Brien factors weighed in favor of 
invalidating Section 48.216 Instead, O’Brien together with a basic 
understanding of semiotics would uphold Section 48 through proper 
statutory construction and recognition of the indexical harm exception 
that the statute tacitly used. 
IV. SNYDER V. PHELPS AND THE LIMITS OF SHANGHAIED
SYMBOLS 
A. Humans and Other Animals as Symbolic Signifiers 
In addition to serving as indexical signifiers, humans and 
animals can also serve as symbolic signifiers.217 Such symbols can be 
conventional (such as using George Washington as a symbol of America) 
or non-conventional (such as using George Washington as a brand of 
cherries). 
Thus, a person might shoot a cow to express his disgust for milk. 
Or another might kidnap and hold hostage a board of directors to express 
his disapproval of capitalism. Much like indexical usage, the living 
beings here also serve as signifiers in such expression. Given the harm to 
living beings and the potential existence of other harmless signifiers for 
such expression, the same rule that applied to harmful indexical 
signifiers should also apply to humans and other animals used as 
symbolic signifiers in a way that violates their rights as living beings. 
                                                          
213. See id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1601. 
214. See id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1601–02. 
215. See id. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 1602. 
        216. See 391 U.S. at 376–77.
217. They can of course also serve as iconic signifiers. For example, a person 
who looks like George Washington can be used to signify George Washington. 
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In a manner similar to the indexical expression exception, one 
can therefore formulate the following exception for symbolic signifier 
use: The First Amendment does not protect symbolic expression (1) 
where the speaker unjustifiably uses218 a living human or other animal as 
a symbolic signifier, and (2) where the living human or other animal 
suffers unjustified, material harm as a result of such use. 
The above rule for live symbolic signifiers presents the same 
issues as living indexical signifiers in the areas of defining harm, 
materiality, and justification discussed above.219 However, what counts 
as “use” of live symbolic signifiers is not always as straightforward as 
what counts as use of live indexical signifiers. In the case of indexical 
signifiers, use is required by the very nature of the signifiers and no gray 
areas exist where, for example, one videotapes a dogfight. Again, the 
dogfight itself is required for the very existence of the tape. Yet, in the 
absence of such a necessary relationship in the case of symbolic 
signifiers, what kind of relationship must exist between a speaker and 
another living human to constitute improper usage of that human as a 
symbolic signifer? Phelps helps us both understand this question and 
sheds further light on the questions of harm, materiality and justification. 
B. The Snyders as Symbolic Signifiers 
1. Matthew Snyder’s Funeral
Again, in Phelps, picketers associated themselves with a dead 
heterosexual soldier’s funeral to garner added attention for their 
placards.220 Prior to their protest, they had issued a press release designed 
to turn the funeral “into a tumultuous media event.”221 The press release 
                                                          
218. Again, force should not be a necessary component here because non-
human animals cannot consent and there are certain activities (such as murder) to 
which human victims cannot consent. See, e.g., People v. Minor, 898 N.Y.S.2d 440 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). Where human consent is permissible, such consent can fall 
under the justification element. However, where force is used the exception should 
apply all the more. 
219. See supra Part III.D.2.b. 
220. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217 (2011). 
221. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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stated that the picketers were coming “to picket the funeral of Lance Cpl. 
Matthew A. Snyder.”222 The press release further stated that “God 
Almighty killed Lance Cpl. Snyder. He died in shame, not honor—for a 
fag nation cursed by God . . . . Now in Hell—sine die.”223
On the day of Matthew Snyder’s funeral, the picketers carried 
placards expressing their belief that “God hates and punishes the United 
States for its tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in America’s 
military.”224 For about one half hour before the funeral, they picketed on 
public land 1,000 feet from the church holding the funeral service.225 The 
picketers obeyed all police instructions.226 The funeral procession came 
within 200 to 300 feet of the picketers and Matthew Snyder’s father 
could see the tops of their signs but not their content.227
However, while watching a newscast later that evening Matthew 
Snyder’s father learned of the signs’ content.228 This content included the 
following: “God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” “America is 
Doomed,” “Don’t Pray for the USA,” “Thank God for IEDs,” “Thank 
God for Dead Soldiers,” “Pope in Hell,” “Priests Rape Boys,” “God 
Hates Fags,” “God Hates You,” and “You’re Going to Hell.”229 The signs 
also included purely iconic expression such as a depiction of “two men 
engaging in anal intercourse.”230
Claiming emotional distress, Matthew Snyder’s father filed five 
Maryland state law claims in federal district court, including claims for 
intrusion upon seclusion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
civil conspiracy.231 Matthew Snyder’s father explained at trial how the 
                                                          
222. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1225. 
223. Id.




228. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1213–14. 
229. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1213. I do not of course claim that these placards 
on their own have no First Amendment protection. Instead, I argue that problems 
arise when the protestors use Mr. Snyder’s father in the symbolic fashion discussed 
in this article. See infra Part IV.B.2–3. 
230. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1225 (Alito, J., dissenting). Again, I do not claim 
that this placard on its own has no First Amendment protection. Instead, I argue that 
problems arise when the protestors use Mr. Snyder’s father in the symbolic fashion 
discussed in this article. See infra Part IV.B.2–3. 
231. Phelps, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1214 (majority opinion). 
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picketers’ actions harmed him both mentally and physically, including 
exacerbating his diabetes.232 Among other things, he stated: “I look at 
this as an assault on me. Somebody could have stabbed me in the arm or 
in the back and the wound would have healed. But I don’t think this will 
heal.”233 Matthew Snyder’s father subsequently prevailed on the 
intrusion upon seclusion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
civil conspiracy claims and was awarded substantial compensatory and 
punitive damages.234
On First Amendment grounds, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
judgment because it found the picketers’ statements “were on matters of 
public concern, were not provably false, and were expressed solely 
through hyperbolic rhetoric.”235
The Court granted certiorari and agreed with the Court of 
Appeals that the picketers engaged in public, not private speech even 
though they “spoke in connection with a funeral.”236 Finding such public 
expression exercised on public land entitled to special First Amendment 
protection, the Court agreed that the intentional infliction of emotional 
harm judgment should be set aside.237 Rejecting the claim that Matthew 
Snyder’s father was a member of a captive audience,238 the Court 
similarly concluded that Snyder’s father could not recover on the claim 
for intrusion upon seclusion.239 Because the third claim of civil 
conspiracy was based on these two torts, the Court concluded that 
Snyder’s father could not recover on that claim either.240 As in Stevens,
Justice Alito was the lone dissenter.241
                                                          
232. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1207
(2011) (No. 09-751), 2010 WL 2145497, at *6. 
233. Id. at *8. 
234. Phelps, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1214. 
235. Id.
236. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1217. 
237. Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1219. 
238. See infra Part IV.B.2 for a further discussion of the captive audience 
doctrine. 
239. Phelps, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1220. 
240. Id.
241. See id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1212 (Alito, J., dissenting); U.S. v. Stevens, 
559 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1582 (2010). 
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2. The Question of Use 
For the two-part living symbolic signifier use exception 
discussed above to apply in Phelps, there must first be use of a human 
being as a symbolic signifier.242 There can be no reasonable denial that 
this necessary element exists. As noted above, the picketers’ press 
release expressly stated that they were picketing Matthew Snyder’s 
funeral because “[h]e died in shame, not honor—for a fag nation cursed 
by God.”243 The Court thus acknowledged that “[t]here is no doubt that 
[the picketers] chose to stage [their] picketing at . . .  Matthew Snyder’s 
funeral to increase publicity for [their] views.”244 As the Court further put 
it, the picketers “exploited the funeral ‘as a platform to bring their 
message to a broader audience.’”245
Although use of the deceased Matthew Snyder cannot meet any 
living use element, use of his funeral surely can. A funeral is a gathering 
of living people and it is just this gathering—especially Matthew 
Snyder’s family—that the picketers wished to use symbolically. The 
picketers in fact posted a message online in which they specifically used 
Matthew Snyder’s parents in their message:
Albert and Julie RIPPED that body apart and 
taught Matthew to defy his Creator, to divorce, and 
to commit adultery. They taught him how to 
support the largest pedophile machine in the 
history of the entire world, the Roman Catholic 
monstrosity . . . . They also, in supporting satanic 
Catholicism, taught Matthew to be an idolater. 
 . . . . 
Then after all that they sent him to fight for the 
United States of Sodom, a filthy country that is in 
lock step with his evil, wicked, and sinful manner 
of life, putting him in the cross hairs of a God that 
                                                          
242. See supra Part III.D.2.c. 
243. Phelps, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1225 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
244. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1217 (majority opinion). 
245. Id.
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is so mad He has smoke coming from his nostrils 
and fire from his mouth! How dumb was that?246
On these facts, therefore, did the picketers improperly use 
Matthew Snyder’s father as a living symbolic signifier? The only 
reasonable answer is that they did.247
The fact that the picketers were approximately 1,000 feet from 
the funeral,248 the fact that they were on public land,249 the fact that they 
obeyed the police,250 and the fact that Matthew Snyder’s father could not 
initially read the picket signs251 are all irrelevant to the question of 
symbolic use. From any distance, one can use another as a symbol and 
can do so even if that person never knows of such use, and even if such 
use does not violate any police instructions. I can, for example, use the 
Queen to symbolize propriety even though we are oceans apart. Such 
usage on its face does not require that either of us be in any certain place. 
Such usage can occur even if she never knows about it and can occur 
regardless of whether it violates any police instructions. Similarly, 
though in a much less tasteful fashion, the picketers used Snyder’s father 
to signify a part of their message. 
                                                          
246. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1226 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
247. With their words and placards as signifiers, they of course also used Mr. 
Snyder and the other mourners as an unwilling private audience. See Heyman, supra 
note 24, at 107 (“The real issue in cases like Snyder is whether there is a First 
Amendment right to address speech of this sort to the mourners at a funeral and 
thereby cause them profound emotional distress.”); Schauer, supra note 37, at 100–
03; Clay Calvert, Too Narrow of a Holding? How–And Perhaps Why–Chief Justice 
John Roberts Turned Snyder v. Phelps into an Easy Case, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 111 
(2012) (discussing how the Court narrowly framed the case to eliminate 
considerations of the Snyders as a private audience). See generally Jeffrey Shulman, 
Epic Considerations: The Speech That the Supreme Court Would Not Hear in 
Snyder v. Phelps, 2011 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 35 (2011), available at 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/622 (discussing internet postings by 
Phelps members that the Court majority refused to consider in Snyder).
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Thus, the Court’s discussion of the “captive audience 
doctrine”252 misses the point.253 Conceding for the sake of argument that 
Matthew Snyder’s father was not a captive audience, he was of course a 
captive speaker. He was forced to help the picketers convey their hateful 
message about him and about his dead son,254 and forcing Mr. Snyder to 
participate in such speech of course raises First Amendment issues of its 
own.255
3. The Questions of Harm, Materiality, and Justification 
Having answered the question of use in the affirmative, we must 
next examine whether the picketers used Matthew Snyder’s father in a 
way that caused him unjustified, material harm. There can be no 
reasonable doubt that the picketers caused Snyder’s father material 
harm.256 To recover on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
                                                          
252. That Matthew Snyder’s father did not have to view or hear the picketers’ 
actions. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (majority 
opinion). 
253. Phelps, 562 U.S. at ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1219–20 (majority opinion). 
254. See id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1222–25 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
255. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 
U.S. 557, 573–74 (1995) (describing how freedom of speech involves the choice of 
what to say and what not to say); see also Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 151–52
(3d Cir. 2010) (A district attorney violated a woman’s First Amendment right to be 
free from compelled speech where the district attorney threatened charges against 
the woman for sending sexually suggestive text messages unless she attended an 
education program. The education program amounted to compelled speech because 
there was no evidence that the woman possessed or distributed sexually suggestive 
photographs of herself and the education program would require the woman to write 
an essay explaining how her actions were wrong.). 
256. On the issue of harmfully using others as signifiers, Justice Alito raises 
the interesting hypothetical of the culpability of “a cold and calculated strategy to 
slash a stranger as a means of attracting public attention.” Phelps, 562 U.S. at ___,
131 S. Ct. at 1227 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer in his concurrence notes that 
Justice Alito’s dissent requires the Court “to ask whether our holding unreasonably 
limits liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress—to the point where A 
(in order to draw attention to his views on a public matter) might launch a verbal 
assault upon B, a private person, publicly revealing the most intimate details of B's 
private life, while knowing that the revelation will cause B severe emotional harm. 
Does our decision leave the State powerless to protect the individual against 
invasions of, e.g., personal privacy, even in the most horrendous of such 
circumstances?” Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1221 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice 
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distress under applicable state law, Matthew Snyder’s father had to prove 
“that the conduct at issue caused harm that was truly severe.”257 In fact, 
the injury must be “so severe that no reasonable man could be expected 
to endure it.”258 Thus, the elements of this tort claim are difficult to meet, 
and the jury’s unchallenged factual finding of the severity of harm 
therefore more than satisfied the material harm requirement.259
Consistent with this, the Court pointed out that there would have 
been no liability had the picketers instead held signs stating “God Bless 
America” and “God Loves You.”260 This is true because Matthew 
Snyder’s father would not have been used as a signifier in a way that 
harmed him. Unfortunately, the Court drew the wrong conclusion that 
“[i]t was what [the picketers] said that exposed [them] to . . .  
damage[].”261 It was not what they said but how they said it—using 
Matthew Snyder’s father as a signifier in a way that caused him harm.
Whether this case falls outside First Amendment protection 
should therefore turn on the final issue of justification.262 Was the 
infliction of such severe harm upon Matthew Snyder’s father justified 
under the facts of this case? 
The answer, of course, is no. Just as the signifiers in the animal 
crushing and dogfighting cases are fungible, Matthew Snyder’s father 
was not a necessary signifier for the message the picketers wished to 
convey. As Justice Alito pointed out, there were effectively an infinite 
number of other ways to convey the substance of their message.263
                                                          
Breyer believed the Court’s decision does not leave the State so powerless. Id. at 
___, 131 S. Ct. at 1221–22. 
257. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Figueiredo-
Torres v. Nickel, 584 A.2d 69, 75 (1991)). 
258. Id. (quoting Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 616 (1977)). 
259. As Justice Alito noted in his dissent, the picketers “abandoned any effort” 
to show error in these severity of harm findings, maintaining instead “that the First 
Amendment gave them a license to engage in such conduct.” Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 
1223. 
260. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1219 (majority opinion). 
261. Id.
262. See supra Part IV.A. 
263. See Phelps, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1222, 1223–24. (Alito, J., 
dissenting). Again, the very concept of “reasonable” in this context must take into 
the account the harm caused Mr. Snyder. This would of course broaden the universe 
of the reasonable. 
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Nor were there other facts in this case that could reasonably 
justify using Matthew Snyder’s father as a signifier.264 First, even if no 
reasonable fungible signifier alternative existed, justification must still 
weigh the rights of the picketers against the right of Snyder’s father not 
to suffer the serious injury he suffered. It is difficult to see how Snyder’s 
father’s right to avoid such serious injury would not trump any right of 
the picketers to use him as a part of their message. 
Additionally, Snyder’s father was not a public figure, and thus, 
no reasonable argument can exist that he was somehow entitled to 
reduced protection on those grounds.265 Nor were the picketers’ actions 
protected by the strict limitations imposed on regulation of offensive 
expression266—they were entitled to their offensive expression but were 
not entitled to use Matthew Snyder’s father as a signifier of such 
expression.267 Nor were restrictions on the picketers’ use of Snyder’s 
father as signifier subject to strict scrutiny—it was not the expression but 
the harm involved in “shanghaiing” Snyder’s father as signifier that is 
the issue in this case.268 Nor were public forum issues involved since the 
picketers could have expressed their anti-gay and anti-Catholic message 
on the same grounds with signifiers that did not involve the Snyder 
                                                          
264. In equity at least, any justification analysis should also consider the 
picketers’ tactics as part of a broader approach that has allowed them to “bargain” 
for free airtime in exchange for their forbearance. For example, the picketers 
accepted free radio airtime in exchange for not picketing the funeral of a nine-year 
old girl their announcements had proclaimed “better off dead.” Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. 
at 1224–25. 
265. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 
424 U.S. 448 (1976). Even if he had been a public figure, it would not change the 
fact that he was not a required signifier for the picketers’ expression.
266. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16–17 (1971). 
267. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (on the First Amendment not 
protecting violence); see also supra Part IV.B.1 (regarding the mental and physical 
injuries suffered by Matthew Snyder’s father).
268. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (addressing draft card 
burning as symbolic speech and upholding regulations on such acts where the 
government has regulation powers in the field, where important or substantial 
governmental interests are advanced by such regulation, this interest is not related to 
the expression, and the regulatory burden is no greater than necessary to advance this 
interest). 
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family.269 Nor were religious discrimination issues in play since the 
picketers could have used signifiers other than Matthew Snyder’s father 
to advocate their message.270 Nor were any freedom of association issues 
in play271 since, again, the picketers were free to march together so long 
as they did not use Matthew Snyder’s father as a signifier of their 
message. Finally, though the picketers’ actions may have been 
“hyperbolic,”272 their actions were certainly not satire and somehow thus 
protected on such grounds.273
In fact, one could make the claim that speech is better served by 
taking the Snyders out of the equation. If the picketers truly intended 
only to claim that homosexuality is evil and that God punishes the United 
States for its tolerance of homosexuality,274 and if their attacks on the 
Snyders275 were truly intended to express this more general point, then 
use of other signifiers than the Snyders would have expressed their 
message more clearly. Their tactic basically assured that the intended and 
perceived meaning of their expression would diverge. 276 Even if others 
could have seen through the clamor and grasped the intended message 
about the claimed dire effects of the tolerance of homosexuality, they 
would almost certainly have perceived additional unintended 
meanings—such as the homosexuality of the heterosexual Matthew 
Snyder,277 and the exceptional nature of Matthew Snyder’s case—since 
the picketers chose to protest his specific funeral. This same point holds 
even if one does not accept the claim that the intended message was so 
limited. Even if the picketers also meant malign fallen soldiers and their 
families regardless of their sexuality, independent observers would still 
                                                          
269. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding a ban on picketing 
one household rather than picketing in general). 
270. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding 
that a school could not discriminate against religious viewpoint in a limited public 
forum it had created). 
271. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (recognizing such a right). 
272. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. ___, ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1210,
1214 (2011) (majority opinion). 
273. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
274. See Phelps, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1225–26 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
275. See id.
276. See supra Part II.D. 
277. See Phelps, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1225 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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have been likely to perceive a claim that Matthew Snyder was 
homosexual.278
Additionally, many would have also likely perceived Matthew 
Snyder’s situation as allegedly more egregious than the other cases since 
his funeral was the funeral the picketers chose to protest.279 The 
perceived meaning would thus diverge from any intended meaning in 
any such case. Hence, Matthew Snyder’s father should have been 
compensated for his serious injury.280
This is not to say, however, that all injurious symbolic usage of 
living beings lies outside the scope of First Amendment protection. For 
example, where a person used as a signifier consents to such usage and 
no criminal or public policy issues demand otherwise,281consent should 
justify usage in some cases even where the human signifier suffers 
substantial harm. For example, a person with an incurable, sexually-
transmitted disease might (out of a desire to help others) consent to be a 
symbol of the result of unsafe sexual practices. No one could reasonably 
maintain that such expression would not enjoy full First Amendment 
protection even though the infected person might suffer substantial 
reputational or financial harm as a result of such public exposure. In such 
a case, the consensual harm to the living person would not violate 
criminal law or public policy, and the message would in fact advance 
sound public policy of risk education in the area of that disease. 
Even where the living human used as signifier does not consent 
and suffers substantial harm, there can still be cases where such 
expression enjoys full First Amendment protection. Certain cases 
involving public figures would be obvious examples.282 For instance, if a 
                                                          
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. See id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1222–23 (describing the elements for an 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim, how speech can satisfy these 
elements and how the respondents did not challenge the sufficiency of the 
petitioner’s evidence to state such a claim). In addition to emotional distress, the 
Snyder family’s privacy was invaded, their personal dignity was attacked, and their 
religious freedom to bury their son in the manner required by their faith also fell 
under siege. See Heyman, supra note 24, at 154–57. 
281. For example, the case of murder films where the victim’s consent would 
be no defense See, e.g., People v. Minor, 898 N.Y.S.2d 440 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
282. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Time, Inc. v. 
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
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congressman persistently accepts bribes, he should be fair game as a 
symbol of congressional corruption even if such usage results in the loss 
of his seat. Using the corrupt congressman as a signifier is permissible 
because he accepted a position of public trust283—meaning he is publicly 
accountable for his actions—and because excluding the congressman as 
a signifier would materially alter the message’s idea. 284
Even in cases of non-public figures, First Amendment protection 
can apply as well. For example, if a contractor has repeatedly criminally 
swindled clients, there should be full First Amendment protection for 
using him as a symbol of such corruption. He is involved in such 
corruption, he has put himself within the scope of public criminal 
process, and any signifier change would change the meaning of the 
expression by leaving out this contractor’s example.285
Admittedly, justification can be reasonably debated in endlessly-
imaginable cases and its full treatment is well beyond the scope of this 
article. However, justification cannot reasonably be claimed in the 
crooked congressman’s or crooked contractor’s cases. Nor, for all the 
reasons given above, can justification be reasonably claimed for the 
symbolic signifier usage of Matthew Snyder’s father.286
                                                          
283. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254; Firestone, 424 U.S. 448. 
284. The signifier’s fungibility thus differs here from that in Phelps. If the 
message in Phelps is about God’s hatred, homosexuality, and the American military, 
then Matthew Snyder’s father is no inherent part of that message.
285. Again, therefore, such a signifier is not fungible in the way of Matthew 
Snyder’s father.
286. On August 6, 2012, President Obama signed legislation criminalizing 
protests at military funerals within three hundred to five hundred feet of such 
funerals both two hours before and two hours after such funerals. Honoring 
America’s Veterans and Caring for Camp Lejeune Families Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-154, § 601, 126 Stat. 1165, 1195 (2012) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
1388 (2012)). This statute was enacted after a number of state statutes were enacted 
on the same subject. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218 
(2011) (majority opinion). Presumably this statute does not preclude further civil 
restrictions and further state criminal restrictions on such protests. See Wyeth v. 
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (describing pre-emption jurisprudence, noting that 
Congress’ purpose is the ultimate touchstone in pre-emption cases and noting that it 
is to be assumed, especially when Congress legislates in a field which the States 
traditionally occupy, that state police powers are not to be superseded by federal law 
unless that is Congress’ clear and manifest purpose); see also Phelps, 562 U.S. 
at___, 131 S. Ct. at 1227 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is absolutely nothing to 
suggest that Congress and the state legislatures, in enacting these laws [including an 
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V. CONCLUSION 
These sad decisions in Stevens and Phelps (and the unnecessary 
suffering they continue to permit) demand correction. They demand 
correction of flawed expression analysis that lacks necessary semiotic 
depth. They demand correction of mechanical notions of law that conceal 
judicial choice at forks in the road. They demand correction of claims 
that dictionaries settle constitutional or statutory interpretation issues 
without regard to applicable reference or focus. They demand correction 
of claims that canons such as noscitur a sociis impermissibly rewrite law. 
They demand much better of the Court. As noted above, perhaps the 
construction principles set forth by Chief Justice Roberts in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius provide hope that the 
Court will do better in future cases.287 If so, any such optimism is of 
course tempered by Justice Alito’s joining the dissent in Sebelius.288 In 
such dissent, Justice Alito, the lone voice of reason in Stevens289 and in 
Phelps, voted to strike down the Affordable Care Act because (again in 
the words of Chief Justice Roberts) “Congress used the wrong labels.” 290
                                                          
earlier 2006 version of 18 USC § 1388], intended them to displace the protection 
provided by the well-established IIED tort.”).
287. See supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text. 
288. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012) (dissenting opinion). 
289. In Stevens, Justice Alito adamantly maintained that the Court had “a duty 
to interpret § 48 so as to avoid serious constitutional concerns, and § 48 may 
reasonably be construed not to reach almost all, if not all, of the depictions that the 
Court finds constitutionally protected.” U.S. v. Stevens, 562 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. 
Ct. 1577, 1597 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
290. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2597 (majority opinion). 
